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Abstract
This thesis consists of three chapters. The first two chapters study the
macroeconomic and financial stability implications of income inequality
and discuss how a low interest rate environment can alter its consequences.
The third chapter studies how macroeconomic and financial instability can
arise from foreign shocks in the presence of global banks.
Chapter 1 presents an analytical model of mortgage and housing
markets. The framework departs from standard lending models with
exogenous lending constraints by incorporating collateral into a rational
default model. The model predicts that following an increase in income
inequality house prices decline and aggregate default risk rises in equi-
librium. I then show that low real rates mitigate the depressing effect of
inequality on house prices at the cost of amplifying aggregate default risk
in the mortgage market.
Chapter 2 studies how income inequality is associated with house
prices, mortgage debt and mortgage delinquency using panel data of US
states. In order to isolate the effect of income inequality from that of the
declining real rates, I use year fixed effects in the specifications, in addition
to state fixed effects and covariates that vary both by year and state. I find
that the data verifies the predictions of the theoretical framework presented
in Chapter 1 of this thesis.
Chapter 3 analyses the role of global banks in international transmission
of shocks when countries have different domestic financial market struc-
tures. In particular, (i) bank capital requirements and (ii) firm borrowing
constraints are different across countries. I show that a financial shock
might give rise to a global decline in real output if the shock originates
in the country with loose firm borrowing constraints. Moreover, tight
borrowing constraints and high bank capital requirements are associated
with limited economic contraction and fast recovery following a financial
shock, independent of its origin.
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Chapter 1
Income Inequality, Mortgage Debt
and House Prices: An Analytical
Model
The last few decades in the US have been characterized by two secular trends:
rising income inequality and declining real interest rates. This chapter studies
macroeconomic and financial stability implications of increasing income inequality
and discusses how a low interest rate environment can alter its consequences. I
develop an analytical model of mortgage and housing markets. The framework
departs from standard lending models with exogenous lending constraints by
incorporating collateral into a rational default model. The model predicts that
following an increase in income inequality house prices decline and aggregate
default risk rises in equilibrium. I then show that low real rates mitigate the
depressing effect of inequality on house prices at the cost of amplifying aggregate
default risk in the mortgage market.
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1.1 Introduction
In recent decades the US has experienced a steady increase in income
inequality. In the period preceding the Great Recession of 2008-09, this was
accompanied by rapid growth in real house prices and household debt.
These patterns can be seen in Figure 1.1, which plots the Gini coefficient,
debt-to-income ratio and real house price between 1980 and 2016. Credit
growth has been documented to be one of the main determinants of
financial crises Schularick and Taylor (2012). In the case of the US, it
has been argued that increasing income inequality led household debt to
rise.1 This paper contributes to this debate by investigating how income
inequality influences mortgage debt, house prices and the risk of mortgage
default.2
FIGURE 1.1. Income inequality, real house prices and household debt-to-
income ratio in the US
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Data source: US Census Bureau, US Flow of Funds, Federal Housing and Finance
Agency, Bureau of Labor Statistics
1Among others Krueger (2012), Rajan (2010), Stiglitz (2012) and Kumhof et al. (2015)
suggest that rising inequality may have contributed to the recent financial crisis by causing
an increase in household credit.
2Using historical cross-country data, Jorda et al. (2016) compare the influence over
business cycles of different components of credit, and find that the main determinant of
contemporary cycles is mortgage booms. Such episodes are followed with deep recessions
and slow recoveries.
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The first contribution of this chapter is to document new cross-sectional
facts regarding growth in income inequality, house prices, and mortgage
credit. Figure 1.2 plots the partial correlation with the change in Gini
coefficient between 1999 and 2011 for three variables using data from US
counties. The first panel shows the relationship between the change in
Gini coefficient and real house price growth, the second the relationship
with real mortgage debt growth, and the third the relationship with the
change in the delinquency rate. In constructing this figure I control for
a variety of county characteristics. The figure shows that counties which
experienced a greater increase in income inequality between 1999 and 2011
had lower house price growth, lower mortgage debt growth and a greater
increase in the delinquency rate over the same period.3 For both house
prices and mortgage debt, the cross-sectional relationships are at odds
with the aggregate trends in Figure 1.1, although the positive correlation
between income inequality and delinquency suggests a channel through
which higher inequality may have reduced financial stability.
The second contribution of this chapter is to construct a structural
model which can be used to study the inequality-house price-mortgage
debt nexus. The model is parsimonious, but allows for feedback effects
between housing and mortgage markets. Households with heterogeneous
incomes borrow to finance housing purchases. Housing serves as collateral
for these loans. Borrowers may later default if doing so offers higher utility
than repayment. In this case they forfeit their housing assets. There is no
information asymmetry in the model. Perfectly competitive lenders offer
a menu of mortgage contracts to each borrower. Mortgage interest rates
vary with the value of the collateral and mortgage debt, both of which are
chosen by borrowers.4 The mortgage interest rate increases with debt and
decreases with the size of collateral. Borrowers internalize these effects
when choosing their mortgage. Borrowers at different points in the income
distribution make different contract choices. A rise in income inequality
increases the number of households that opt for low housing consumption
and make low down-payments, and these loans have a high default risk.
3These correlations are robust to the inclusion of control variables such as county mean
income and population growth. In Figures 2.2 to 2.4 I construct the partial correlations
using US state level data between the years 2003 and 2015, and find similar relationships.
Figure 1.D.2.1 provides additional evidence on house price-inequality relationship for a
longer time period.
4Geanakoplos (2014) calls this menu of contracts a credit surface, wherein the
mortgage interest rate depends on the value of collateral and the borrower’s credit score.
In my model, lenders use default risk instead of a credit score when pricing mortgage
loans.
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FIGURE 1.2. Changes in income inequality, real house price growth,
mortgage debt growth and change in mortgage delinquency rate
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Data source: US Census Bureau, New York Fed Consumer Credit Panel, Federal Housing
and Finance Agency, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Note: All growth rates and changes are calculated between the years 1999 and 2011 for
US counties. To construct this figure I use the binscatter command in Stata . This
regresses the three title variables on the change in Gini coefficient, state fixed effects, mean
income growth, population growth, the share of subprime borrowers in 2000, median
income in 1999, and the number of households in 1999. The slope of the line of fit is
the coefficient for the change in Gini coefficient in this regression. For the data points,
it first obtains the residuals from regressions of the title variable and the change in Gini
coefficient on the other control variables. These are then grouped in twenty equally sized
bins for the Gini coefficient residual. The position of each point is the mean value of the
title variable residual and Gini coefficient residual for one of these bins.
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In equilibrium this has two effects. First, aggregate demand for housing,
and thus house prices, declines. Second, aggregate default risk increases.
This is consistent with the cross-sectional evidence presented in Figure 1.2.
This raises the question of why house prices and mortgage debt have
been increasing with income inequality in the aggregate data. Another
secular trend for the US in the same time period is declining real interest
rates. In the model, a decline in the real interest rate leads the mortgage
interest rate and down-payment to decline for all mortgage contracts.
Borrowers then demand larger houses, which increases house prices.
Declining real interest rates can thus overturn the negative effect of
increasing inequality on house prices, and allow the model to match the
aggregate trend in real house prices. However, this further undermines
mortgage market stability. Holding default risk fixed, a fall in the real
interest implies that the associated contract has a lower down payment
and a higher level of housing consumption. The reduction in down
payment and increase in housing consumption are particularly high for
mortgage contracts where there is a high risk of default. This leads to
more borrowers opting for these high risk mortgages. Aggregate default
risk further increases, amplifying the effect of rising income inequality.
This paper therefore also contributes to the literature on the risk-taking
implications of low interest rate environments by providing a mechanism
which operates through the housing market.5
In my model, a rise in income inequality in absence of a change in
lending conditions, i.e. change in the real rates, corresponds to a worsening
of the borrower pool in terms of mortgage risk-type selection. Appendix
1.C.2 provides additional analyses of the cross-sectional facts presented
in Figure 1.2 in order to inspect the underlying mechanism. I find that
in the cross-section of US counties, a rise in mortgage debt and house
prices are associated with relative income gains in the lowest 3 quintiles
of the income distribution. On the other hand, income gains in the
top of the income distribution is negatively associated with both income
and house price growth. Finally, Appendix 1.D shows that Figure 1.2 is
robust under subsamples with different share of subprime mortgages and
housing supply elasticity measured by Saiz (2010). Therefore, the negative
correlation is not driven by the US counties with high share of subprime
5 DellAriccia et al. (2014) present a theoretical model of bank-risk taking. They show
that, when bank capital cannot adjust, a decrease in the real interest rate can increase risk-
taking. However, this results depends on the shape of an exogenous loan demand. Similar
to my paper, Sheedy (2018) studies the financial stability implications of low interest rates
through housing and mortgage markets.
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borrowers that have been argued to have the largest boom and bust episode
in mortgage debt and house prices due to expansion in the supply of credit.
Neither, large counties with limited housing construction display dynamics
different than those where it is easy to build.
Relation to the Literature. This paper is related to the literatures on
income inequality, house prices and mortgages, and financial stability.
In particular, it theoretically and empirically links the literature on the
relationship between inequality, debt and financial crises relationship to
the literature on the house price-credit nexus.6
Similar to this paper, Kumhof et al. (2015) study income inequality
as a long-run determinant of financial risk and household debt. They
employ a two-agent model in which aggregate output is shared by two
income groups. Top earners are the top 5% of the income distribution
and act as lenders with the bottom 95% being borrowers. They show that
increasing the income share of the top 5% leads them to save more, which
in turn reduces interest rates and increases borrowing by the bottom 95%.
This increases the risk of a financial crisis. My paper complements their
analysis by allowing for greater income heterogeneity among borrowers,
and studying the effects of income inequality on house prices. I find
that, for a cross-section of US counties, growth in the income of the top
5% is negatively correlated with mortgage debt growth.7 It can then be
argued that the model of Kumhof et al. (2015) describes a case where the
effect of declining interest rates dominates the effect of increasing income
inequality.8
Nakajima (2005) studies the implications of higher earnings risk for
house prices and debt by employing a quantitative overlapping generations
model. He compares steady states for environments with low and high
income variance. The low variance environment is calibrated using data
for 1967, and the high variance environment with data for 1996. He finds
that debt is lower and house prices are higher in the steady state with
higher income variance.9
6Blinder (1975), Auclert and Rognlie (2018) and Straub (2018) study the effect of
income inequality on consumption behavior. The focus of this paper is the interaction
between borrowing behaviour and house prices. Over the business cycle house price
developments are strongly correlated with consumption and credit.
7See Appendix 1.C.2 for details and Figure 1.D.2.2.
8Cairo and Sim (2018) introduce monetary policy into the framework of Kumhof et al.
(2015).
9Iacoviello (2008) and Krueger and Perri (2006) also investigate the effects of higher
income risk on household debt. Both find that consumption smoothing leads household
debt to increase with income risk. These studies do not incorporate housing or default.
20
Several empirical studies have examined the question of whether rising
income inequality is related to household debt, and is thus a source of
financial instability as suggested by Rajan (2010). Most studies in this
literature use country level data, and their findings have been conflicting.10
For instance, Bordo and Meissner (2012) finds no evidence of a rise in
the top income share leading to credit booms, whereas Perugini et al.
(2016) finds a positive relationship between income concentration and
private sector debt. Schularick and Taylor (2012) and Mian et al. (2017)
document the role of credit growth in the occurrence of financial crises.11
More recently, Paul (2017) has suggested that a rising top income share
is a better predictor of financial distress than credit growth, while Kiley
(2018) suggests run-ups in house prices. My paper shows that financial
risk, debt and inequality form a nexus with feedback effects between the
variables, so should be studied in a general equilibrium framework. In
addition, mortgages comprise the largest part of household debt and are
closely correlated with house prices. The dynamics of house prices are
thus both endogenous to this nexus and essential to understand it. In
contrast to these studies, I use a micro measure of financial risk, mortgage
delinquency, in my analysis of a panel of US states.
Another literature focuses on the cyclical relationship between house
prices and credit. These studies do not address the role of changing
inequality. It is generally accepted that housing and mortgages markets
were at the heart of the Great Recession of 2008-9. Since the onset of the
crisis, an extensive amount of research has examined the causes of this
particular cycle. The research on the house price and mortgage boom has
attributed these developments to either changes in lending standards or
house price expectations.12 Justiniano et al. (2016) is closely related to this
paper. In a two-agent analytical framework, they show that following an
expansion in the credit supply house prices and mortgage debt increase
10An exception is Coibion et al. (2014). They employ borrower level data and find
that borrowing by low income households does not increase with local income inequality.
They construct a model in which lenders use income inequality in the local area together
with the borrower’s income level to infer exogenous default risk. This model produces a
decline in lending to low income borrowers when local income inequality increases.
11Jorda et al. (2016) find that the growth of mortgage credit in particular has been an
increasingly important determinant of financial stability.
12For example, Justiniano et al. (2015), Favilukis et al. (2017) and Kiyotaki et al. (2011).
See Mian and Sufi (2018) for a review of quantitative models which incorporate the
explanations related to credit supply. Piazzesi and Schneider (2009) and Glaeser et
al. (2012) support the view that house price expectations played an important role in
the boom episode. Using a quantitative model, Kaplan et al. (2017) suggest that both
an exogenous change in lending terms and expectations of increasing house prices are
necessary needs to match the dynamics of leverage and house prices.
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more in areas with a higher share of subprime borrowers. Their model
abstracts from default: subprime borrowers are defined as agents for whom
a minimum consumption constraint binds. In my model, expected default
risk is an equilibrium choice, and is endogenous with respect to house
prices. This leads to feedback effects between house prices and aggregate
risk in the economy.13, 14
On the empirical side, my paper is related to the literate that employs
identification strategies based on geographical variation. This line of
research was initiated by Mian and Sufi (2009), and many papers have
used similar techniques.15 Most recently, in a similar manner to this paper,
Gertler and Gilchrist (2018) use a panel of US states to study the effects of a
local development and an aggregate development separately. In particular,
they use this strategy to disentangle the effects of house prices and lending
disruption on employment during the recession.
My model abstracts from heterogeneity in housing quality: real house
prices are measured by an aggregate house price index. Määttänen and
Terviö (2014) allow for matches between different income households and
different house qualities. They reach a similar conclusion to this chapter
regarding the relationship between house prices and income inequality.
For a given distribution of housing qualities, a mean-preserving spread of
the income distribution leads to a decline in the prices of lower quality
houses, which can spillover to the higher end of the quality distribution.
16 Määttänen and Terviö (2014) do not include mortgages and endogenous
13Adelino et al. (2016) show that the default share of prime borrowers increased during
the financial crisis. Therefore, an ex-ante measure of risk may not represent the rational
risk choice of these borrowers.
14Corbae and Quintin (2015), Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2015), Hedlund (2016) and
Campbell and Cocco (2015) among others find a relationship between house price changes
and foreclosures in a quantitative model. Mian et al. (2015) document that mortgage
foreclosures had significant effects on house prices and employment.
15For example, Midrigan and Philippon (2016) and Mian et al. (2013). See Nakamura
and Steinsson (2017) for a discussion of the use of regional variation for identification
in macroeconomics, and its applications in areas other than household credit and house
prices.
16They consider a mean and order-preserving change in the income distribution.
Incomes below a certain quintile decrease while those above it increase. Reduced incomes
at the lower end of the distribution push the price of lower quality houses down. This
spills over to the higher housing qualities as each borrower is a marginal buyer for a
given quality. If the difference between high and low quality houses is not large, prices
decline across the income distribution as no buyer wants to pay for extra housing quality.
Landvoigt et al. (2015) also employ a quantitative assignment model of housing. They
differ from Määttänen and Terviö (2014) in that in their model housing purchases are
financed with mortgages. They show that capital gains between 2000 and 2005 for low
quality houses in San Diego can be explained by a combination of an increase in the
income of buyers of these houses, a relaxation in lending terms and high house price
expectations.
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default decision and thus cannot address the implications of a change in
income inequality for this two variables.
Layout. The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2
presents an equilibrium model of housing and mortgage markets. Section
4 concludes. Appendix 1.C.2 provides additional analyses of the cross-
sectional facts presented in Figure 1.2.
1.2 An analytical model of housing and mortgage
markets
To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first to use a general
equilibrium structural model to study the response of house prices and the
mortgage market to changes in income inequality. The key ingredients of
the model are endogenous lending terms and rational default decisions.
This leads lenders to offer borrowers a menu of different mortgage
contracts to choose from. The menu offered depends on the borrower’s
income, so borrowers with different income levels will choose different
levels of housing and mortgage debt. This allows the probability of default
to vary with with income level. Changes in the income distribution then
lead to concurrent changes in housing and mortgage demand. In general
equilibrium, housing and mortgage markets both clear. This means that
house prices and the aggregate default risk are determined endogenously.
Environment. The model has two periods t = 1, 2. There is a
continuum of borrowers who differ in their first period endowment
income. A measure ψ(y1i) of borrowers receive endowment income y1i,
and the income distribution is denoted by Ψ. Endowment income in the
second period is
y2i = ωy1i
where ω is an aggregate income growth shock which renders this income
uncertain. The distribution of income growth shocks is denoted by Ω.17 In
addition to their endowment income, each household receives a housing
endowment of h. The housing endowment is symmetric across the income
17The distribution of initial endowment incomes can be interpreted as a skill
distribution, and ω as an aggregate labor productivity shock. For simplicity, this set-
up here abstracts from idiosyncratic risk and income mobility. It is consistent with the
finding of Guvenen et al. (2017) that income inequality is persistent over the life cycle in
the US.
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distribution.18 Households borrow in the first period. In the second
period, they observe their income and decide whether to repay their
loan. Borrowers derive utility from non-durable consumption in both
periods, but housing consumption is valued only in the first period.19 The
consumption good is the numeraire and pt is the house price in period
t = 1, 2.
Borrowers. Borrowers maximize their lifetime utility, which is derived
from non-durable and housing consumption. In the second period, the
total resources available for consumption depend on the default of the
borrower. For each income growth realization the borrower faces the
following trade-off. If she defaults she loses her house, incurs a default
cost proportional to her income, and receives debt relief without recourse.
On the other hand, if she repays, she can consume her entire endowment
and the value of her house net of the repayment. Let cd2i and c
r
2i denote
consumption under default and repayment, respectively. The rational
default rule may then be defined as:
1i(ω, y1i, di, h1i) =
1 if cd2i(ω, y1i) > cr2i(ω, y1i, h1i, di)0 otherwise
The default rule takes a value of one for income y1i, mortgage debt di and
housing h1i if the borrower chooses to default at this point in the state
space. There is no information asymmetry, so lenders use the same default
rule when they price loans. To simplify notation, I henceforth to use 1i in
place of 1i(ω, y1i, di, h1i). In the first period, the borrowers’ optimization
problem is:
max
h1i,di,c1i
U1(c1i, h1i)+
βEΩ
{
max
1i
1iU2(cd2i(ω, y1i)) + (1− 1i)U2(cr2i(ω, y1i, h1i, di)
} (1.1)
subject to the constraint
c1i + p1h1i = y1i + q(y1i, di, h1i)di + p1h
18Income is the sole source of inequality in the model.
19The borrowers are assumed not to derive utility from housing in the second period
to simplify the algebra.
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This constraint states that first period consumption, c1i, and housing
expenditure, p1h1i are financed by endowment income, the value of the
initial housing endowment, p1h, and a mortgage loan priced at q. For
each unit of debt di to be repaid in the second period, the lender gives the
borrower qdi units of consumption good in the first period. The interest rate
of the loan is given by the inverse of the loan price. Borrowers internalize
the effect of their choices of housing consumption and debt on the loan
price, and their effects on the default decision in the second period for
each realization of the aggregate income shock.
Lenders. Lenders are perfectly competitive, risk neutral and have deep
pockets. Housing serves as collateral. If a borrower defaults, the lender
seizes their house and receives θp2(ω) per unit of housing, where θ is the
loan recovery rate and p2(ω) is the relative house price when the income
growth realization is ω.20
Lenders solve the optimization problem:
max
di
di
{
−qi + 1R f EΩ
(
1− 1i + 1i θp2(ω)h1idi
)}
di and qi correspond to the volume and price of the loan for the
borrower with income y1i. Lenders discount future consumption at the
risk-free rate R f . Perfect competition between lenders and risk neutrality
lead to the following loan price schedule:
q(y1i, di, h1i) =
1
R f
EΩ
(
1− 1i + 1i θp2(ω)h1idi
)
If the borrower repays the loan irrespective of the realization of the
income growth shock, that is EΩ1i = 0, then the loan price is equal to
the lenders’ discount rate. I refer to any contract with a combination of
debt and housing collateral such that the borrower will always repay the
mortgage as risk-free.
When the borrower strategically defaults under certain income growth
realizations, EΩ1i > 0, the lenders price this risk. If there was no collateral,
as is the case with models of sovereign default a la Eaton and Gersovitz
(1981), the price would be the lenders’ discount factor adjusted by the
default probability EΩ1i
R f
. The presence of collateral gives rise to a loan
spread that is lower than the default risk, and is endogenous to the amount
20Here the foreclosure cost (1− θ)p2(ω) is assumed to be a deadweight loss consistent
with the evidence from US that foreclosed properties sell for around 20-30% lower than
other properties with similar characteristics.
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of collateral and debt. Unsurprisingly, a high loan-to-value ratio, dip1h1i ,
leads to a low loan price.
Functional forms. In order to derive closed-form solutions, I make two
assumptions regarding functional forms. In order to simplify aggregation
in the housing market, preferences are assumed to be quasi-linear in
consumption.21 Second, I assume that lenders do not derive utility from
housing consumption. This assumption is relaxed in Justiniano et al.
(2015). However, they assume that lender’s demand for housing is a fixed
exogenous quantity. The stock of housing available to borrowers is the
aggregate housing stock net of lenders’ fixed housing consumption.22 The
assumption in this paper corresponds to lenders having a fixed housing
demand of zero. Trades in the housing market are then always between
borrowers.
Finally, I assume that income growth risk can take two values
ω =
ωH , with probability νωL , with probability 1− ν
ν is the probability of high income growth. This assumption simplifies
the loan price schedule q(y1i, di, h1i) and the default rule 1i, which will
be described in detail in the next section. Moreover, house prices in the
second period are assumed to depend on income growth realization and
to be weakly pro-cyclical. That is, house prices in the second period
under high income growth realization is p2(ωH) and it is p2(ωL) under
high income growth realization. I assume house prices are pro-cyclical:
p2(ωH) ≥ p2(ωL).
General equilibrium. The general equilibrium of the model is defined
as market clearing in both housing and mortgage markets. In the mortgage
market, borrowers and lenders take house prices as given, and across the
income distribution borrowers make different housing consumption and
mortgage debt choices. The mortgage market clears loan-by-loan in a
manner that is consistent with the loan pricing schedule. In the housing
market, contract choices are taken as given and the aggregate demand for
housing varies with mortgage market conditions. Housing demand is the
21Justiniano et al. (2015) also assume quasi-linear preferences in order to derive
analytical results.
22This assumption is a simple way of introducing housing market segmentation.
Changes in lending terms then only affect the price of houses that borrowers buy.
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aggregate of housing consumption choices across the income distribution,
p1 is then implicitly defined by market clearing as:
ˆ
h1i(p1, y1i)ψ(y1i)di = h
I first describe the mortgage market equilibrium, and then formalize the
general equilibrium. Having characterized the general equilibrium, I study
the effects of income inequality and its interaction with low interest rates.
1.3 Partial equilibrium in the mortgage market
I solve for mortgage market equilibrium through backward induction. I
begin with the rational default decision of borrowers in the second period.
I then move to the first period decisions of both lenders and borrowers.
Here lenders price mortgage loans, and borrowers choose mortgage and
housing portfolios. Both lenders and borrowers take into account the
optimal second period default policy for borrowers.
1.3.1 Default/Repayment decision
In the second period the borrower makes a rational default decision.
Borrowers do not derive utility from housing in the second period. If a
borrowers chooses to repay her loan, she sells her house. In order to sell
her house, she must pay a fixed cost κ.23 Utility under repayment is:
U2(cr2i) = ωy1i − di + p2(ω)h1i − κ
If the borrower defaults, she receives a share ξ of her second period
endowment income and consumes it.24 Therefore, utility under default is:
U2(cd2i) = ξωy1i
Under these assumptions, the borrower’s default rule can be written as:
1(ω, y1i, di, h1i) =
1 if di ≥ (1− ξ)y1iω+ p2(ω)h1i − κ0 otherwise
23These fixed costs can also include any fixed costs and fees associated with the
mortgage loan.
24Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), Arellano (2008) and Kumhof et al. (2015) also assume
income losses in the case of default. This captures the effect of default penalties outside
of asset forfeiture, such as a negative effect on the borrowers’ credit history.
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A borrower defaults on her loan if the price of housing is sufficiently
low, if her income is sufficiently low, or under some combination of the
two. The final case corresponds to the double-trigger explanation of
default, under which negative home equity is a necessary but not sufficient
condition for default. Borrowers may find it optimal to repay even if they
are underwater due to the costs associated with default. This is consistent
with the finding of Gerardi et al. (2017) that borrowers remain current on
their mortgage debt even when they are underwater.25
1.3.2 Loan pricing by the lenders
For lenders to price loans in the first period, it is necessary to specify
their expectation of house prices in the second period EΩp2(ω). I assume
that expectations are uniform across lenders, and that the house price is
positively correlated with the aggregate income shock.
The default rule implies the existence of two debt thresholds d¯Li and d¯
H
i .
These are the minimum levels of debt where a borrower with first period
income y1i and housing h1i would default when the aggregate shock takes
values ωL and ωH.
d¯Li = (1− ξ)y1iωL + Ep2(ωL)h1i − κ
d¯Hi = (1− ξ)y1iωH + Ep2(ωH)h1i − κ
Note that d¯Li ≤ d¯Hi . The loan pricing schedule for a borrower with
income y1i who purchases housing h1i is given by:
q(y1i, di, h1i) =

1
R f
if di ≤ d¯Li
1
R f
{ν+ (1− ν)θEp2(ωL) h1idi } if d¯Li < di ≤ d¯Hi
0 otherwise
(1.2)
If di ≤ d¯Li , then the borrower repays for all realizations of the aggregate
shock and the loan is risk-free. The loan is thus priced at the lender’s
discount rate. If di > d¯Hi , then the borrower will always default on the
loan. I assume that lenders will not issue loans in these circumstances, so
the price is zero. For debt levels between these thresholds, the borrower
defaults only when aggregate income growth is low. The loan is repaid
25See Gete and Reher (2016) and Jeske et al. (2013) for models with one period mortgage
loans with rational default decision. Both papers assume that borrowers default when they
are underwater and there is no utility or economic cost of default. Among others, Foote
et al. (2008) provide empirical evidence of double-trigger defaults. See Foote and Willen
(2017) for a review of mortgage default research.
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in full with probability ν. With probability 1 − ν, the borrower defaults
and the lender seizes the collateral. Since the borrower only defaults when
aggregate income growth is low, the expected price of the housing collateral
is the price conditional on low income growth EΩp2(ωL).
For a risk-free loan with di ≤ d¯Li , an increase in housing collateral raises
d¯Li , but has no effect on the loan price, or equivalently on the interest rate.
For risky loans with d¯Li < di ≤ d¯Hi , an increase in housing collateral will
increase d¯Hi and the price of the loan. This heterogeneity across loan types
affects the optimal choice of housing consumption. Moreover, I will show
later that it leads a change in the risk-free rate to have heterogeneous effects
for different types of borrowers.
Relation to the exogenous lending constraint models. How does the
framework here relate to the existing models of borrowing constraints with
fixed loan-to-value(LTV) or loan-to-income(LTI) constraints?
This framework includes LTV constraints as a special case. Let λLTV =
d
h1 p1
and λLTI = dy1 denote LTV and LTI ratio. The debt threshold for a
given income growth realization can be expressed as
λLTV ≤ (1− ξ)ωλLTV
λLTI
+
Ep2(ωH)
p1
− κ
h1p1
Assume that there is no proportional income loss from default, ξ = 1,
and no fixed cost in the housing market, κ = 0. This can then be simplified
to a LTV constraint which depends on the expected house price:
λLTV ≤ Ep2(ω
H)
p1
While not the focus of this paper, the framework here provides a micro
foundation for the relaxation of lending constraints following an increase
in lenders’ house price expectations.26
Next I characterize optimal debt and housing choices, and show the
implications of the optimal portfolio choice for default risk across the
income distribution.
26Kaplan et al. (2017) show that an increase in the exogenous LTV limit has limited
effect on house prices unless it is accompanied by an increase in house price expectations.
Within the framework of my model LTV limits themselves are endogenous to house price
expectation. This may amplify the effect of lenders’ beliefs on house prices and leverage.
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1.3.3 Mortgage debt and housing consumption choice across
the income distribution
In the first period borrowers choose mortgage debt and housing consump-
tion. When doing so, they internalize the effect of their decisions on
the loan price and their second period default decision. Lenders offer
a continuum of loan contracts with loan prices determined by default
risk and the value of housing collateral. As I have shown, loans can be
categorized as risk-free, in which case the borrower always repays, and
risky, in which case the borrower defaults when aggregate income growth
is low. The borrower’s problem can be solved in two steps. The first to step
is to find the optimal housing and debt choices conditional on the loan
being risk-free and risky. The second is comparing the borrower’s utility
in the two cases to find the overall optimal choice. Appendix 1.A presents
the borrower’s problem conditional on choosing a risk-free and risky loan.
I discuss only the results within the main text.
As preferences are quasi-linear, housing consumption under each loan
type is a fixed amount. Let hNR and hR represent housing consumption
under risk-free and risky loans. In addition, due to quasi-linear preferences
and borrower impatience, when the loan is risk-free debt is d¯Li , and when
the loan is risky debt is d¯Hi . That is, for both mortgage contract types
borrowers opt for the highest debt level.
Proposition 1. Let
γ = (1− ξ)
{
ωL − νωH
R f
+ βν(ωH −ωL)
}
There exists a unique income cut-off y¯
y¯ =
1
γ
{
1− ν
R f
κ − φ ln
(
hNR
hR
)}
such that borrowers with income less than y¯ take risky loans as long as risk-free
rate is sufficiently high
R f ≥ 1
β
νωH −ωL
ωH −ωL
Proposition 1 implies that the borrower’s contract choice can be
represented by the function ΓR which takes value 1 when the borrower
opts for a risky contract
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ΓR =
1 if y1 ≤ y¯0 if y1 > y¯
The two panels of Figure 1.3 display expected default and housing
consumption policy functions for borrowers of different income levels.
Across the income distribution, different contract choices arise due to a
trade-off faced by borrowers which has three components. Conditional on
choosing a risky loan, a borrower
1. makes a lower down-payment (Lemma 1)
2. has lower housing consumption (Lemma 2)
3. has lower expected second period consumption (Lemma 3).
compared to a risk-free loan. As the borrower makes a lower down-
payment, her consumption in the first period is higher. Utility derived
from first period consumption is thus higher than under a risk-free loan.
Expected consumption in the second period is lower for two reasons. When
aggregate income growth is low, the borrower defaults and loses part of
her endowment. In addition, her expected income from selling her house
is lower as it is lost when she defaults.
For low income borrowers, the utility gain from a low down-payment
exceeds the cost from the risk of default, so they sort into risky loans.
Borrowers with incomes above a certain level will not wish to sacrifice
expected second period consumption to increase first period consumption.
When interest rates are high, the gain in first period consumption when
switching from a risk-free loan to a risky loan is low. Therefore, only low
income borrowers opt for risky loans. When interest rates are low, loan
prices are high and down-payments low. This makes switching from risk-
free to risky loans more attractive. The model thus implies that in very
low interest rate environments all borrowers will find it optimal to take out
risky loans.
Lemma 1. The down-payment of a risky loan is lower than a risk-free loan at all
points in the income distribution.
A sufficient condition is:
νωH
ωL
≥ 1
The down-payment for both risk type borrowers depends on the second
period fixed housing transaction cost. This is because each borrower
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FIGURE 1.3. Policy functions for default probability and housing
consumption
Borrower income
Expected default probability
y1i
EΩ1
0
1 − ν
y¯
Borrower income
Housing consumption
y1i
h1i
hR
hNR
y¯
Note: As described in Proposition 1, borrowers with income below y¯ choose
mortgage contracts with a default probability of 1 − ν. Housing consumption
for these borrowers is hR units. Borrowers with income above y¯ always repay and
have housing consumption hNR.
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optimally selects the highest level of debt that is associated with their
debt repayment frequency, which is a function of fixed transaction cost
as described in (1.2). With a risky loan, the borrower repays infrequently
and the effect of the fixed cost is small. This means that the part of
the down-payment which is invariant with respect to borrower income is
smaller under a risky loan compared to a risk-free loan.27 If the sufficient
condition holds, the down-payment for a risky loan is small across the
income distribution.
Lemma 2. Housing consumption is higher under a risk free contract compared to
a risky contract:
hNR ≥ hR
as long as loan recovery rate is sufficiently low:
θ ≤ θmax where θmax = 1− (1− βR f )
(
Ep2(ωH)
Ep2(ωL)
− 1
)
ν
1− ν
Housing consumption affects utility both directly and indirectly. Since
the direct marginal utility effect is symmetric, the indirect marginal utility
effects determine whether borrowers want to consume more housing under
one loan type compared to the other. Under a risky loan, an increase in
housing consumption raises the loan price as houses serve as collateral.
This relaxes the first period budget constraint. The higher the loan recovery
rate, the higher is the impact of this channel. As described earlier, this effect
is absent in a risk-free loan.
On the other hand, the effect of selling the house in the second period
and consuming is weaker under a risky loan as the borrower defaults when
aggregate income growth is low.
Moreover, as housing acts as collateral, an increase in housing consump-
tion increases both debt thresholds. The impact of this relaxation is unclear
as there are two forces at play: ∂d¯i∂h1i and the shadow value of debt, λ
R. In
comparison to a risk-free loan, the former is high and the latter is low
under a risky loan.28
27This is the source of the down-payment gain from a risky loan for a borrower with
low income.
28λR = νλNR = ν( 1
R f
− β) in equilibrium. For x ∈ {H, L}
∂d¯xi
∂h1i
= EΩp2(ωx)
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For a borrower to buy a larger house under a risky loan, it must be the
case that the loan price effect dominates all other indirect utility effects.
This requires a high loan recovery rate. Put differently, when the recovery
rate is sufficiently low, there is a positive loan spread for risky loans.
This means that loan prices for risky loans are low, so borrowers consume
smaller housing. This is formalized in Lemma 2.
When borrowers’ and lenders’ discount rates are sufficiently close,
housing consumption under a risk-free loan is high for any feasible value
of the loan recovery rate. Similarly, when the house price risk is low, i.e.
Ep2(ωH)
Ep2(ωL)
is close to 1, housing consumption is high under a risk-free loan.
The third component of the contract choice is the expected utility
derived from second period consumption. Since preferences are linear
in consumption in the second period, a difference in consumption levels
directly translates to a difference in utility. Expected second period
consumption is higher under a risk-free loan than a risky loan. Under a
risky loan, a borrower expects to consume ξωy1i for each realization of the
aggregate shock. When income growth is ωL, the borrower defaults, loses
their house and a fraction (1− ξ) of her endowment and consumes what
remains. When income growth is ωH, the amount the borrower repays is
equal to the value of her house plus a fraction (1− ξ) of her endowment,
so she makes no financial income through selling her house. With a risk-
free loan, the borrower’s second period consumption is a fraction ξ of her
endowment when the second period shock is ωL. When the shock is ωH,
the borrower’s financial income is positive, so her consumption is higher.
Lemma 3. Expected second period consumption is higher under a risk-free loan
than a risky loan across the income distribution.
Taking stock: Borrowers of all income levels derive higher expected
utility from second period consumption when their loan is risk-free. Under
a risky contract, they make a smaller down payment and consume more
in the first period. Since preferences are linear in consumption, lifetime
utility derived from non-durable consumption is linear in income. The
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relative consumption (utility) gain from a risky loan can be expressed as:29
CR − CNR = 1− ν
R f
κ − y1(1− ξ)
{
ωL − νωH
R f
+ βν(ωH −ωL)
}
FIGURE 1.4. Utility trade-off: costs and benefits of a risky loan
Note: The diagram plots the utility costs and benefits from switching to a risky
loan for different levels of borrower income. For borrowers with income below y¯,
the utility benefits exceed the utility costs.
The intercept of the relative non-durable consumption utility gain is
due to the down-payment being lower under a risky loan then a risk-free
loan for a borrower with zero income. The higher the transaction cost in
the housing market, the larger is the gain under a risky loan.
Figure 1.4 represents Proposition 1 graphically. It plots the total
consumption gain from a risky loan against the housing utility cost. Low
income borrowers opt for risky loans as long as the gain from a low down-
payment exceeds the costs of lower housing and expected second period
consumption. This is true when the fixed cost κ is sufficiently high, so
that the intercept of the consumption gain is above that of the housing
29
CR = hp1 − νR f κ − φ+ y1{1+ βξ(νω
H + (1− ν)ωL) + (1− ξ)νω
H
R f
}
CNR = hp1 − 1R f κ − φ+ y1{1+ β(νω
H + (ν+ ξ)ωL) +
(1− ξ)ωL
R f
}
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utility loss. This is the benchmark specification that I use to study the
consequences of income distribution changes.30
1.4 General Equilibrium
The equilibrium of the model is characterized by quantities {hR, hNR, dRi , dNRi },
prices {qi, p1} and contract type choice ΓRi such that
1. Borrowers optimize by solving problem 1.1 with associated decision
rules {hR, hNR, dRi , dNRi , ΓRi }
2. The mortgage market clears loan-by-loan with loan prices defined by
equation 1.2 and decision rules {hR, hNR, dRi , dNRi , ΓRi }
3. The housing market clears at price p1
ˆ
(ΓRi h
R(p1) + (1− ΓRi )hNR(p1))ψ(y1i)di = h
Total housing demand is obtained by aggregating individual housing
consumption choices over the income distribution. Since the population is
normalized to 1 and and all borrowers begin with an initial endowment of
hosing h, the aggregate housing supply is h.
Remark 1. The general equilibrium of the model can be represented in (p1, S)
space as follows:
The locus of (p1, S) consistent with housing market clearing is HH:
ShR(p1) + (1− S)hNR(p1) = h (HH)
The locus of (p1, S) consistent with mortgage market clearing is MM:
S = Ψ(y¯(p1)) (MM)
where Ψ(y¯(p1)) is the share of borrowers with income less than y¯, and thus S is
the share of risky borrowers.
• The HH curve is downward sloping in S
30Three other cases are possible. First, if the real interest rate is low, then the
consumption gain schedule is upward sloping and it is optimal to choose a risky loan
irrespective of income. Second, if κ is small and the risk-free rate is low, then only the
risk-free contract exists in equilibrium. Finally, if κ is small and the risk-free rate is high,
then low income borrowers will opt for risk-free loans and high income borrowers risky
loans. The last case may arise at business cycle frequency. Adelino et al. (2016) show
that middle-income, high-income, and prime borrowers all sharply increased their share
of delinquencies in the recent crisis. Since the focus of the current paper is the long-
run determinants of house price and credit developments, I leave this interesting case for
future research.
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• The MM curve is upward sloping in S
FIGURE 1.5. General equilibrium of the model
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Note: The HH curve represents equilibrium in the housing market. The MM
curve represents equilibrium in the mortgage market.
Figure 1.5 represents the general equilibrium of the model with house
prices p1 on the y-axis and the share of risky borrowers S on the x-axis.
The HH curve has intercept pNR. This corresponds to the case where
all borrowers choose risk-free loan, housing demand is high and thus
the equilibrium house price is at its highest level. As the share of risky
borrowers increases, the total demand for housing declines. Thus, the
house price declines along the HH curve.
The MM curve depicts how the share of risky borrowers changes with
the house price, which is taken as given in the mortgage market. Figure
1.6 displays the effect of a change in the house price on the income cut-off,
and thus on the share of risky borrowers. As the house price increases, the
housing consumption cost of a risky loan decreases. This implies that it is
optimal for a higher share of borrowers to choose a risky loan. That is, y¯
increases. This is because hNR has a higher price elasticity than hR. Thus
a risky loan is less costly in terms of housing consumption at high price
levels.
A change in the risk-free rate shifts both the HH and MM schedules.
However, a change in the income distribution from Ψ to Ψ˜ lead only MM
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FIGURE 1.6. Effect of an increase in house prices on mortgage market
partial equilibrium
Note: The diagram plots the utility costs and benefits from switching to a risky
loan for different levels of borrower income. For borrowers with income below y¯,
the utility benefits exceed the utility costs.
to shift, which then implies a movement along HH. These experiments are
the topic of subsequent sections.
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1.5 The general equilibrium effect of an increase
in income inequality: matching the cross-
sectional facts
FIGURE 1.7. The general equilibrium impact of a mean-preserving increase
in income inequality
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Note: The HH curve represents equilibrium in the housing market. The MM
curve represents equilibrium in the mortgage market for a given house price.
A mean-preserving change in income inequality shifts MM0 to MM1. The
equilibrium of the model moves from point A to point B.
I now study the general equilibrium effect of a mean-preserving
increase in income inequality. I hold mean income constant in order
to isolate the effect of an increase in inequality.31 I show that a mean-
preserving increase in income inequality leads to a decline in equilibrium
house prices and an increase in the share of risky borrowers. This result is
depicted in Figure 1.7.
The intuition for this result is as follows. A mean-preserving increase in
income inequality means that incomes decline for the lower percentiles of
the distribution. The share of borrowers with incomes below y¯ thus rises.
I consider Pareto and log-normal income distributions, two empirically
plausible parametric income distributions for which it is possible to derive
an analytical result for the change in the share of risky borrowers.
31See, for instance, Blinder (1975) and Auclert and Rognlie (2018) for applications to
consumption demand.
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FIGURE 1.8. Effect of a mean-preserving increase in income inequality on
income percentiles
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Note: This is a parametric representation of a change in income inequality
calibrated using US data and assuming a log-linear income distribution. The y-
axis shows income levels, and the x-axis the cumulative density with incomes
below this level. The blue solid line matches the Gini coefficient and real mean
income for the year 1992. The yellow dashed line matches the Gini coefficient for
the year 2016, holding mean income at its 1992 level.
Figure 1.8 shows an example of a mean preserving increase in inequal-
ity. The y-axis shows real household income in hundred thousand dollars,
the x-axis the cumulative share of borrowers below each income level. The
blue solid line is calibrated such that it matches the Gini coefficient and
median income for the year 1992.32 The yellow dashed line is calibrated
to match the Gini coefficient for 2016, while holding mean income at its
1992 level. A mean-preserving increase in inequality corresponds to an
increase in the higher income percentiles. For instance, the median earner
in the 2016 distribution has lower real income then to the median earner
in the 1992 distribution. In terms of the model, when the income cut-off
is sufficiently low, this change in income inequality increases the share of
borrowers below it. If the income cut-off is forty thousand dollars, then
the change depicted would lead to seven percentage point increase in the
number of risky borrowers.
32For 1992, the US Gini coefficient is 0.433 and real median income is 51390 US dollars.
The Gini increased to 0.481 in 2016.
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FIGURE 1.9. The relationship between an increase in income inequality
and the upper income limit in different income quintiles
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Data source: US Census Bureau.
Note: The y-axis of each subplot is the real growth rate of the upper limit
of a particular income quintile, median or lower limit of top 5 percent. The
binscatter command of Stata is used to produce this figure. Change in the
Gini coefficient is grouped into 20 equally sized bins. The position of each point
in the graph is the mean value of the change in the Gini coefficient and mean
value of y-axis variable for one of these bins. All growth rates and changes are
calculated between the years 1999 and 2011.
41
A mean preserving increase in income inequality is consistent with the
data. Figure 1.9 plots the cross-sectional correlation between the change in
the Gini coefficient and upper limits of different income quintiles, median
income and the lower limit of top 5 percentile between the years 1999 and
2011. The figure shows that an increase in income inequality is associated
with an increase in the lower limit of the top 5 percentile only. That
is, areas that experienced large increases in income inequality tended to
experience large declines in income limits in the lowest three quintiles
and the median county income. A rise in income inequality is associated
with a lower decline in the 80th income percentile. This implies that a rise
income inequality at the cross-section corresponds to a more than half of
the population that has incomes below the median income of 1999.
1.5.1 Income Distribution: Pareto
The Pareto distribution is characterized by two parameters: a scale
parameter ymin and a shape parameter α. The mean Gini coefficient and
mean a Pareto distribution are:
Gini =
1
2α− 1, Mean =
α
α− 1ymin
The scale parameter affects only the mean of the distribution, whereas the
shape parameter affects both the mean and the Gini coefficient.
For this distribution, the fraction of borrowers with income lower than
y¯ is:
Ψ(y¯) = 1−
(
ymin
y¯
)α
A increase in income inequality corresponds to a decline in α. As yminy¯ <
1, Ψ(y¯) must then decline. The formula for mean income implies that this
change will also increase mean income.
In order to understand the impact of income inequality alone, I consider
changes in income inequality with mean income held constant. To achieve
this, I vary ymin with α. Let mean income be fixed at M¯, then
ymin = M¯
α− 1
α
For a given mean income level, the share of borrowers with income below
y¯ can be written as:
Ψ(y¯) = 1−
(
M¯
y¯
α− 1
α
)α
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Proposition 2. A mean-preserving increase in income inequality under a Pareto
income distribution increases the share of risky borrowers in the economy
∂Ψ(y¯)
∂Gini
> 0
as long as
Ψ(y¯) ≤ 1− exp(−1) = 0.63
For the income inequality levels of the early 1990s, the sufficient
condition is much weaker than Proposition 2. The share of risky borrowers
in the economy before the mean-preserving change is required to be less
than around 95%. Equivalently, in the new income distribution, incomes of
the top 5% must have increased, and incomes of the bottom 95% declined.
That is, income must have been redistributed towards the top of the income
distribution.
The Pareto distribution is widely used to study incomes in the upper
tail, rather than the whole distribution. For robustness, I also consider the
log-normal income distribution.
1.5.2 Income Distribution: Log-normal
The log-normal distribution is characterized by parameters µ and σ2. The
Gini coefficient, mean and median of a log-normal distribution are given
by33
Gini = er f
(σ
2
)
, Mean = exp
(
µ+
σ2
2
)
, Median = exp (µ)
Similar to the Pareto distribution, one parameter, µ, affects only the
mean income, while another, σ2, affects both mean income and the Gini
coefficient.
For this distribution, the fraction of borrowers with income below y¯ is
Ψ(y¯) =
1
2
+
1
2
er f
(
ln(y¯)− µ√
2σ
)
From these formulas, it is straightforward to show that an increase in
inequality increases the share of the population with income below the
33where er f is the error function defined as:
er f (x) =
1
pi
ˆ x
−x
e−t
2
dt
er f (x) is an increasing function of x.
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median. The share of risky borrowers will then also increase as long as less
than half of the population opt for a risky loan.
Proposition 3. An increase in income inequality under a log-normal income
distribution increases the share of risky borrowers in the economy
∂Ψ(y¯)
∂Gini
> 0
as long as
y¯ ≤ median
An increase in inequality will also increase mean income. Let M¯ be
the target level of mean income. The cumulative density function can be
expressed as:
Ψ(y¯) =
1
2
+
1
2
er f
(
ln(y¯)− ln(M¯)√
2σ
+
σ
2
√
2
)
To hold mean income constant, it is necessary to vary µ in line with σ.
This is equivalent to varying it with the Gini coefficient. The following
proposition provides a sufficient condition for the share of risky borrowers
to increase following a mean-preserving increase in the Gini coefficient.
Notice that the condition is less restrictive compared to that of Proposition
3.
Proposition 4. A mean-preserving increase in income inequality under a log-
normal income distribution increases the share of risky borrowers in the economy
∂Ψ(y¯)
∂Gini
> 0
as long as
y¯ ≤ eσ2median
For the log-normal distribution, an increase in inequality with mean
income held constant leads even some incomes above the median to
decline. Given the rates of defaults in the data, the sufficient condition
is likely to hold. In the calibrations of Figure 1.8, eσ
2
median is around the
80th income percentile. Data from the US counties in Figure 1.9 shows
that incomes in the bottom 60th percentiles tended to fall when income
inequality increased.
In the next section I study the effect of a change in the risk-free rate on
the equilibrium of the model. I then study the interaction of these effects
with those of a rise in income inequality.
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1.6 The general equilibrium effect of a decline in
the risk-free rate
This section analyses the impact of a decrease in the risk-free rate on the
equilibrium house price and aggregate default risk. Unlike an increase in
income inequality, a change in the risk-free rate affects partial equilibrium
in both the housing and mortgage markets. That is, both the HH and MM
loci shift.
FIGURE 1.10. The general equilibrium impact of a decline in the risk-free
rate
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Note: The HH curve represents the partial equilibrium in the housing market. The
MM curve represents the equilibrium in the mortgage market for a given house
price. A decline in the real rate shifts the MM curve from MM0 to MM1, and the
HH curve from HH0 to HH1. The equilibrium of the model moves from point A
to point B.
A decline in the risk-free rate increases loan prices. Therefore, down-
payments fall. This enables borrowers to increase housing consumption
under any contract type, so the HH curve shifts outwards. For a
given share of risky borrowers, equilibrium house price increases. The
differential response of hR and hNR to a change in R f determines the slope
of the new housing market clearing condition. If the relative increase in
housing consumption is higher under a risky loan, then the HH curve
flattens. Lemma 5 shows that this is the case as long as loan recovery rate
45
FIGURE 1.11. Effect of a decline in the risk-free rate in the mortgage market
partial equilibrium
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Note: The diagram plots the utility costs and benefits from switching to a risky
loan for different levels of borrower income. For borrowers with income below y¯,
the utility benefits exceed the utility costs.
is sufficiently high. The response of the housing market equilibrium is
shown by the red dashed HH line in Figure 1.10.
A lower interest rate affects the mortgage market as the changes in
down-payments and housing consumption affect mortgage choice. Under
a risky contract, the down-payment declines more (Lemma 4) and the
relative increase in housing consumption is higher (Lemma 5). Changes
in the real rate do not affect expected future consumption. Therefore,
a decline in the real rate leads to a rise in the consumption benefit
of a the risky loan increases, and a fall in the utility cost from lower
housing consumption. For a given price of housing, the income cut-off
rises. Figure 1.11 shows the effect of declining real rates on the mortgage
market, holding the price of house constant. It corresponds to a visual
representation of Proposition 5. An increase in the share of risky borrowers
in the mortgage market leads the MM to shift to the right in Figure 1.10.
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Lemma 4. A decline in the risk-free rate decreases the down-payment more for a
risky loan than a risk-free loan.
A sufficient condition is
νωH
ωL
≥ 1
Lemma 5. There exists a loan recovery rate
¯
θ such that, for any loan recovery rate
above
¯
θ
1. The semi-elasticity of housing demand is higher under a risky loan compared
to a risk-free loan: ∣∣∣∣∂ ln(hR)∂R f
∣∣∣∣ ≥ ∣∣∣∣∂ ln(hNR)∂R f
∣∣∣∣
2. The HH curve flattens following a decline in the risk-free rate.
The following proposition describes the impact of a change in the risk-
free rate on the mortgage market equilibrium. It combines the findings of
Lemma 5 and Lemma 4.
Proposition 5. Holding the price of housing constant, a decline in the risk-free
rate increases the share of borrowers with a risky loan
∂Ψ(y¯(p1))
∂R f
< 0
The general equilibrium effect of a decline in the risk-free rate is an
increase in aggregate mortgage default risk. While the source of decline
in the real rates is not micro-founded in the current paper, it implies that
policies that can limit this decline could contribute to financial stability.
Such examples are taxes on capital inflows or expansionary monetary
policy. The effect on the house price depends on the relative shifts of the
MM and the HH curves.
1.7 Reconciling cross-sectional facts with aggre-
gate trends
This section studies together the effects of rising income inequality and a
decline in the real interest rate. I show a decline in the real interest rate
is necessary to match the observed aggregate trends in income inequality
and house prices. Figure 1.12 adds the effects of a real interest rate decline
to those of an increase in inequality which were depicted in Figure 1.7. An
increase in income inequality moves the economy from A to B, which is
47
consistent with the stylized facts provided earlier. A decline in the risk-
free rate then moves equilibrium from point B to C. The decline in the risk-
free rate overturns the negative effect of income inequality on house prices.
This is accompanied with an increase in the share of risky borrowers in the
economy. A lower risk-free rate stimulates housing consumption across the
income distribution. However, the effect is stronger for the borrowers with
risky loans. This mitigates the effect on house prices.
FIGURE 1.12. Reconciling cross sectional facts and aggregate trends: the
equilibrium impact of rising inequality and a declining real interest rate
Share of risky borrowers
H
o
u
se
p
ri
ce
10
MM1
MM2
A
B
C
MM0
HH0
HH2
inequality ↑ Rf ↓
p1
S
Note: The HH curve represents equilibrium in the housing market. The MM
curve represents equilibrium in the mortgage market for a given house price. A
mean-preserving change in income inequality shifts the MM curve from MM0 to
MM1. A decline in the real rate shifts the MM curve from MM1 to MM2, and the
HH curve from HH0 to HH2. The equilibrium of the model moves from point A
to point C.
1.8 Conclusions
Income inequality, real house prices and household debt have increased
enormously in the US in the last few decades. During the same period,
real interest rates declined to historically low levels. In this chapter, I
first show that US counties that experienced highest increases in income
inequality has also experienced largest (i) declines in house prices, (ii)
increases in mortgage delinquencies and (iii) declines in mortgage debt.
That is, the cross sectional and aggregate trends are at odds. I then present
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a theoretical model that disentangles the effect of income inequality from
macroeconomic developments, particularly the direct effect of declining
real rates. I find that, in isolation, rising income inequality is associated
with declines in real house prices and mortgage debt, but a rise in
mortgage delinquencies. Finally, I show that declining real rates are central
to reconciling the cross-sectional and aggregate correlations as they can
overturn the negative effect of income inequality on house prices. However,
this leads to a rise in mortgage delinquencies and amplifies the effect of
income inequality on financial stability.
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Appendix
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1.A Borrower optimization
In this section I define the optimal decisions consistent with a risk-free
contract and with a risky contract.
1.A.1 Risk-free Loan
Borrower solves the following optimization problem if she were to take on
a risk-free loan:
max
h1i,di
c1i + φ ln(h1i) + βνEcr2i(ω
H) + β(1− ν)Ecr2i(ωL)
subject to
di ≤ d¯Li = h1iEp2(ωL) + (1− ξ)y1iωL − κ
di ≥ 0
q(y1i, di, h1i) =
1
R f
where
c1i = y1i + q(y1i, di, h1i)di − h1i p1 + hp1
cr2i(ω
H) = y1iωH − di + p2(ωH)h1i − κ
cr2i(ω
L) = y1iωL − di + p2(ωL)h1i − κ
Since the borrower repays the debt under each income growth realiza-
tion, the price she pays is the lenders’ discount rate q(y1i, di, h1i) = 1/R f .
The second constraint ensures that the borrowing is low enough to be paid
under low income growth realization. The first order conditions are as
follows:
di : −β+ 1R f − λ1 + λ2 = 0
hi : −p1 + λ1Ep2(ωL) + φh1 + β{νEp2(ω
H) + (1− ν)Ep2(ωL)} = 0
Since borrowers are assumed to be impatient, i.e. β ≤ 1
R f
, first order
condition with respect to mortgage debt implies that the debt constraint
binds in equilibrium. Borrowers’ optimal choices under the risk-free
contract is then
di = d¯Li ,λ
NR
1 =
1
R f
− β,λNR2 = 0
hNR =
φ
p1 − 1R f Ep2(ωL)− βν(Ep2(ωH)− Ep2(ωL))
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Note that each borrower that takes out a risk-free loan consumes the
same amount of housing. This results from log-linear preferences assumed
in order to simplify the aggregation in the housing market.
cNR1i = p1h + y1i − (hNR p1 −
1
R f
((1− ξ)ωLy1i − κ + hNREp2(ωL))︸ ︷︷ ︸
down−payment
Thus down-payment under a risk-free loan is:
down− payment = φ p1 −
1
R f
Ep2(ωL)
p1 − 1R f Ep2(ωL)− βν(Ep2(ωH)− Ep2(ωL))︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥1
− 1
R f
((1− ξ)ωLy1i − ν)
and the expected second period consumption is:
EcNR2i = (νω
H + (ν+ ξ)ωL)y1i + hNRν(Ep2(ωH)− Ep2(ωL))
Discounted lifetime utility derived from non-durable consumption is
then:
CNR = cNR1i + βEc
NR
2i
= p1h− 1R f κ − φ+ y1i
{
1+ β(νωH + (ν+ ξ)ωL) +
(1− ξ)ωL
R f
}
1.A.2 Risky Loan
Risky loan in the model is defined as a promise to repay only under high
income growth realization. Since the lenders make zero expected profit
due to competition, the loan price for a risky loan is given by:
q(y1i, di, h1i) =
1
R f
{
ν+ (1− ν)θEp2(ω
L)h1i
di
}
Borrower solves the following optimization problem if she takes a risky
loan:
max
h1i,di
c1i + φ ln(h1i) + βνEcr2i(ω
H) + β(1− ν)Ecd2i(ωL)
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subject to
di ≤ d¯Hi = h1iEp2(ωH) + (1− ξ)y1iωH − τ
di ≥ d¯Li = h1i p2(ωL) + (1− ξ)y1iωL − τ
q(y1i, di, h1i) =
1
R f
{
ν+ (1− ν)θEp2(ω
L)h1i
di
}
where
c1i = y1i + q(y1i, di, h1i)di − h1i p1 + hp1
cr2i(ω
H) = y1iωH − di + p2(ωH)− κ
cd2i(ω
L) = ξy1ω
The first constraint is to ensure that borrower can repay the loan under
high income growth realization. The second constraint is imposed so that
loan pricing is consistent with borrower choice. That is, if borrower takes an
amount less than the low debt level constraint, she can repay it under low
income growth realization as well and the correct loan price is then lenders’
discount rate. The first order conditions for the borrower optimization
problem are then:
di : ν(−β+ 1R f )− λ1 + λ2 = 0
h1i : −p1 + 1R f (1− ν)θEp2(ω
L) + λ1Ep2(ωH)− λ2Ep2(ωL)+
φ
h1i
+ βνEp2(ωH) = 0
Borrower impatience again implies that it is optimal to take on the
largest loan that she can repay, i.e. λ1 = ν( 1R f − β) > 0. Therefore under a
risky contract it is optimal to have
di = D¯i(ωH),λR1 = ν(
1
R f
− β),λR2 = 0
hR1 =
φ
p1 − 1R f (νEp2(ωH) + θ(1− ν)Ep2(ωL))
cR1i = p1h + y1i−
(hR p1 − 1R f ((1− ξ)νω
Hy1i − κν+ hR(θ(1− ν)Ep2(ωL) + νEp2(ωH)))︸ ︷︷ ︸
down−payment
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Using the equilibrium value of hR, down-payment under a risky loan
is:
down− payment = φ− 1
R f
((1− ξ)νωHy1i − κν)
and the expected second period consumption is:
EcR2i = ξ((1− ν)ωL + νωH)y1i
The lifetime utility derived from non-durable consumption is
CR = cNR1i + βEc
NR
2i = p1h−
ν
R f
κ − φ
+ y1
{
1+ βξ(νωH + (1− ν)ωL) + (1− ξ)νω
H
R f
}
1.B Proofs
1.B.1 Partial equilibrium of the mortgage market
Proposition 1. Let
γ = (1− ξ)
{
ωL − νωH
R f
+ βν(ωH −ωL)
}
There exists a unique income cut-off y¯
y¯ =
1
γ
{
1− ν
R f
κ − φ ln
(
hNR
hR
)}
such that borrowers with income less than y¯ take risky loans as long as risk-free
rate is sufficiently high
R f ≥ 1
β
νωH −ωL
ωH −ωL
Proof. It is optimal to take a risky loan if:
UR −UNR = − φ ln
(
hNR
hR
)
+
1− ν
R f
κ
− y1(1− ξ)
{
ωL − νωH
R f
+ βν(ωH −ωL)
}
≥ 0
1− ν
R f
κ − φ ln
(
hNR
hR
)
− y1γ ≥ 0
Thus, if γ > 0 borrowers with income less than y¯ choose a risky loan.
This is satisfied when
R f ≥ 1
β
νωH −ωL
ωH −ωL
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Lemma 1. The down-payment of a risky loan is lower than a risk-free loan at all
points in the income distribution.
A sufficient condition is:
νωH
ωL
≥ 1
Proof. Under a risk-free loan
down− paymentNR = φ p1 −
1
R f
Ep2(ωL)
p1 − 1R f Ep2(ωL)− βν(Ep2(ωH)− Ep2(ωL))︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥1
− 1
R f
((1− ξ)ωLy1i − ν)
Under a risky loan
down− paymentR = φ− 1
R f
((1− ξ)νωHy1i − κν)
Therefore, a sufficient condition for low down-payment across the
income distribution is piω
H
ωL
≥ 1. Note that, for low income borrowers,
this condition does not need to hold, i.e. when y1i = 0 for instance.
Lemma 2. Housing consumption is higher under a risk free contract compared to
a risky contract:
hNR ≥ hR
as long as loan recovery rate is sufficiently low:
θ ≤ θmax where θmax = 1− (1− βR f )
(
Ep2(ωH)
Ep2(ωL)
− 1
)
ν
1− ν
Proof. Optimality condition under a risky loan is:
φ
h1i
= p1︸︷︷︸
−∂c1i
∂h1i
− 1
R f
(1− ν)θEp2(ωL)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∂q(y1i ,di ,h1i)D
∂D
−λR Ep2(ωH)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∂d¯Hi
∂h1i
+β νEp2(ωH)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∂Ecr2i(ω
H )
∂h1i
Optimality condition under a risk-free loan is:
φ
h1i
= p1︸︷︷︸
−∂c1i
∂h1i
−λNR Ep2(ωL)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∂d¯Li
∂h1i
−β {piEp2(ωH) + (1− pi)Ep2(ωL)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
∂cr2i
∂h1i
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Then hNR − hR ≥ 0 if φhNR −
φ
hR ≤ 0
φ
hNR
− φ
hR
= ν(
1
R f
− β)Ep2(ωH)− ( 1R f − β)Ep2(ω
L)
− (1− ν)(β− θ
R f
)Ep2(ωL)
Thus housing consumption under a risk-free contract is higher than that
of a risky contract as long as:
θ ≤ 1− (1− βR f )
(
Ep2(ωH)
Ep2(ωL)
− 1
)
ν
1− ν
Lemma 3. Expected second period consumption is higher under a risk-free loan
than a risky loan across the income distribution.
Proof.
EcR2i = ξ((1− ν)ωL + νωH)y1i
EcNR2i = (νω
H + (ν+ ξ)ωL)y1i + hNRν(Ep2(ωH)− Ep2(ωL))
1.B.2 General equilibrium representation
Remark 1. The general equilibrium of the model can be represented in (p1, S)
space as follows:
The locus of (p1, S) consistent with housing market clearing is HH:
ShR(p1) + (1− S)hNR(p1) = h (HH)
The locus of (p1, S) consistent with mortgage market clearing is MM:
S = Ψ(y¯(p1)) (MM)
where Ψ(y¯(p1)) is the share of borrowers with income less than y¯, and thus S is
the share of risky borrowers.
• The HH curve is downward sloping in S
• The MM curve is upward sloping in S
Proof.
• The HH curve: Since hNR > hR, then as S increases, total housing
demand declines and thus house prices needs to decline for housing
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market to clear at quantity h.
∂p1
∂S
< 0
• The MM curve:
∂S
∂p1
=
∂S
∂ ln(hNR/hR)
∂ ln(hNR/hR)
∂p1
First partial derivative is negative as relative increase in housing
consumption under a risk free contract discourages taking a risky
contract and thus share of risky borrowers decline. Second partial
derivative is also negative as price elasticity of housing consumption
is higher under a risk-free contract.
∂ ln(hNR)
∂p1
− ∂ ln(h
R)
∂p1
= −h
NR
φ
+
hR
φ
< 0
as hNR ≥ hR.
1.B.3 Share of risky borrowers and change in income in-
equality
Pareto income distribution
Proposition 2. A mean-preserving increase in income inequality under a Pareto
income distribution increases the share of risky borrowers in the economy
∂Ψ(y¯)
∂Gini
> 0
as long as
Ψ(y¯) ≤ 1− exp(−1) = 0.63
Proof.
∂Ψ(y¯)
∂Gini
=
∂Ψ(y¯)
∂α︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
∂α
∂Gini︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
> 0
First,
∂Ψ(y¯)
∂α
= −1−Ψ(y¯)
α− 1
(
α− 1
α
ln(1−Ψ(y¯)) + 1
)
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∂Ψ(y¯)
∂α
≤ 0 i f Ψ(y¯) ≤ 1− exp
(
− 1
α− 1
)α
Note that as α increases, feasible values for Ψ(y¯) declines and thus the
lowest upper bound is given by:
lim
α→∞ 1− exp
(
− 1
α− 1
)α
= 1− exp(−1) = 0.63
Second, using the definition of Gini coefficient for Pareto distribution
α =
1
2
(
1
Gini
+ 1
)
∂α
∂Gini
< 0
For α = 6, the Gini coefficient is as low as 0.1, and the condition that
needs to be satisfied is that Ψ(y¯) ≤ 0.6988. For 1990s levels of income
inequality the condition is Ψ(y¯) ≤ 0.95.
Log-normal income distribution
Proposition 3. An increase in income inequality under a log-normal income
distribution increases the share of risky borrowers in the economy
∂Ψ(y¯)
∂Gini
> 0
as long as
y¯ ≤ median
Proof.
∂Ψ(y¯)
∂Gini
=
∂Ψ(y¯)
∂σ
∂σ
∂Gini
∂Gini
∂σ
=
e− σ
2
4√
pi
> 0
Since er f is increasing in its argument, then it is straightforward to see that
∂
(
ln(y¯)−µ√
2σ
)
∂σ
= −
(
ln(y¯)− µ√
2σ2
)
This is positive if y¯ < eµ =median, or equivalently if Ψ(y¯) < 0.5.
Proposition 4. A mean-preserving increase in income inequality under a log-
normal income distribution increases the share of risky borrowers in the economy
∂Ψ(y¯)
∂Gini
> 0
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as long as
y¯ ≤ eσ2median
Proof.
∂Ψ(y¯)
∂Gini
=
∂Ψ(y¯)
∂σ
∂σ
∂Gini
∂Gini
∂σ
=
e− σ
2
4√
pi
> 0
Let x = ln(y¯)−ln(M¯)√
2σ
+ σ
2
√
2
∂Ψ(y¯)
∂σ
=
1
2
er f ′(x)∂x
∂σ
∂x
∂σ
= −
(
ln(y¯)− ln(M¯)√
2σ2
)
+
1
2
√
2
Since er f (x) is increasing in x, then ∂x∂σ positive if y¯ ≤ M¯e
σ2
2 = eµ+σ
2
,
since median is eµ, then the sufficiency condition can be written as
∂Ψ(y¯)
∂σ
≥ 0 if y¯ ≤ eσ2median
Lemma 4. A decline in the risk-free rate decreases the down-payment more for a
risky loan than a risk-free loan.
A sufficient condition is
νωH
ωL
≥ 1
Proof.
∂down− paymentR
∂R f
=
1
(R f )2
((1− ξ)νωHy1i − κν) > 0
∂down− paymentNR
∂R f
=
1
(R f )2
((1− ξ)ωLy1i − ν) > 0
Similar to the case in Lemma 1 piω
H
ωL
≥ 1 is a sufficient condition.
Lemma 5. There exists a loan recovery rate
¯
θ such that, for any loan recovery rate
above
¯
θ
1. The semi-elasticity of housing demand is higher under a risky loan compared
to a risk-free loan: ∣∣∣∣∂ ln(hR)∂R f
∣∣∣∣ ≥ ∣∣∣∣∂ ln(hNR)∂R f
∣∣∣∣
2. The HH curve flattens following a decline in the risk-free rate.
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Proof.
1.
eNR =
∂ ln(hNR)
∂R f
= −Ep2(ωL) h
NR
φ(R f )2
< 0
eR =
∂ ln(hR)
∂R f
= −(θ(1− ν)Ep2(ωL) + νEp2(ωH)) h
R
φ(R f )2
< 0
Note that as θ increases eR increases monotonically. Let
¯
θ denote the
value at which eR(
¯
θ) = eNR. That is(
¯
θ(1− ν) + νEp2(ω
H)
Ep2(ωL)
)
hR
hNR
= 1
It needs to be proven that the set [θ¯, θmax] is nonempty. I prove by
contradiction. Suppose
¯
θ = ε+ θmax with ε > 0 and thus from Lemma
2 hR > hNR. Then
¯
θ(1− ν) + νEp2(ω
H)
Ep2(ωL)
=
hNR
hR
< 1
Since
¯
θ = θmax + ε, left hand-side becomes
(1− ν)ε+ 1+ βR f
(
Ep2(ωH)
Ep2(ωL)
− 1
)
> 1
contradiction. Thus
¯
θ < θmax.
2. The HH curve flattens if
∂pR
∂R f
/
∂pNR
∂R f
≥ 1
where pR is market clearing price when Ψ(y¯) = 1 and pNR is market
clearing price when Ψ(y¯) = 0. Optimality conditions imply the
following prices:
pR =
φ
h
+
1
R f
(θ(1− ν)Ep2(ωL) + νEp2(ωH))
pNR =
φ
h
+
1
R f
Ep2(ωL)
Then
∂pR
∂R f
= − 1
(R f )2
(θ(1− ν)Ep2(ωL) + νEp2(ωH)) = eR φhR
∂pNR
∂R f
= − 1
(R f )2
Ep2(ωL) = eNR
φ
hNR
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Thus
∂pR
∂R f
/
∂pNR
∂R f
=
eR
eNR
hNR
hR
≥ 1
Therefore, following a decline in the risk-free rate the HH curve
flattens.
Proposition 5. Holding the price of housing constant, a decline in the risk-free
rate increases the share of borrowers with a risky loan
∂Ψ(y¯(p1))
∂R f
< 0
Proof. Remember from Proposition 1 that the income cut-off for the risky
loan is given by:
y¯ =
1
γ
{
1− ν
R f
κ − φ ln
(
hNR
hR
)}
where
γ = (1− ξ)
{
ωL − νωH
R f
+ βν(ωH −ωL)
}
Thus
∂γ
∂R f
= −ω
L − νωH
(R f )2
> 0
Therefore, as R f increases using the results from Lemma 5 and Lemma 4,
y¯ declines. Thus, share of risky borrowers decline with the risk-free rate.
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1.C Cross-sectional analyses on the relationship
between income inequality, house prices and
mortgage debt: US counties
In this section I first describe the data used to derive Figure 1.2 and then
provide more evidence on the relationship between income inequality and
house prices. Finally, I provide a deeper investigation on the relation of
income house prices and mortgage market variables to income inequality
using different quintiles of the income distribution.
1.C.1 County level data
This paper primarily uses data from the U.S. Census and the American
Community Survey (ACS) 5-year averages.34 The Gini coefficient, popu-
lation, mean household income, number of households are obtained from
these source. I use the 1990, 2000, 2011 and 2016 releases. County level
data gives rise to a larger number of cross-sections than state level data.
House price data is from the Federal Housing Finance Agency. This
is a repeat-sales index, that measures average price changes in repeat
sales or refinancing on the same properties since 1975. I deflate nominal
quantities using the CPI-U-RS price index provided by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics.35
County level debt data is from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Consumer Credit Panel (FRBNY CCP). This is publicly available for the
period 1999 to 2011.36 I use the per capita balance of mortgage debt
excluding home equity lines of credit as my measure of mortgage debt.
My measure of delinquency is the percent of the mortgage debt balance
that has been delinquent for more than ninety days. The share of subprime
borrowers is also from this source. The data used for Figure 1.2 includes
34For the ACS, sampling error from the survey decreases with the size of the county
and the number of yearly surveys used, and some counties are not reported in 1 year
surveys. In the decennial Census, income data is for the previous calender year. That
is, the 1990 Census reports income data for the year 1989. In the ACS, income is for the
year prior to the interview date, and the survey is conducted monthly. To avoid sampling
error, income inequality data for 2016 thus includes incomes reported as early as year
2012 for some respondents. However, income levels are adjusted to 2016 current dollars.
The Census Bureau advises the use of ACS 5 years estimates for areas with a population
below 65000.
35This series is considered to be the most detailed and systematic estimate available
of a consistent CPI series. This matters as there was an important methodological in the
construction of CPI series before 2000.
36The data has not been updated since 2011.
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2093 US counties that have data for both house prices and mortgage
variables.
1.C.2 Income inequality and house price growth: County
level evidence
In this section I provide nonparametric evidence regarding the correlation
between real house prices and income inequality growth. This comple-
ments the evidence in Figure 1.2. Inequality is measured by the Gini
coefficient. A higher value of the Gini coefficient corresponds to greater
income inequality. Each panel of Figure 1.D.2.1 displays the real house
price trends for the US counties that had the highest and the lowest
increase in income inequality over a given time period.37 The red dashed
line shows house price growth for counties in the top quintile for income
inequality growth. The blue solid line shows income growth for counties
in the bottom quintile. In both subperiods, being in the bottom quintile
corresponds to experiencing a decline in income inequality. Both subplots
have the same message: house price growth is higher for counties in the
bottom quintile for income inequality growth. The difference is as high as
15.3% in 1999 and 8.8% in 2012.
High income inequality growth is associated with low house price
growth in comparison not only to other counties but also to the initial time
period. That is, for both subsamples, high growth in income inequality is
associated with a real terms decline in house prices.
The second panel of Figure 1.D.2.1 shows that, between 1999-2005,
counties in the highest inequality growth quintile experienced slightly
higher house price growth than other counties. House price growth in
these counties is around 2% higher that of the lowest inequality growth
quintile. Limiting my analysis to this specific time span would lead to the
opposite conclusion to the rest of this paper. In fact, counties where income
inequality growth was lowest experienced a larger boom and a smaller bust
than counties with high income inequality growth that experienced high
house price growth at the beginning of the cycle. Over the entire span of
the data, the boom episode preceding the Great Recession is the exception,
rather than the rule, in terms of the relationship between house prices and
inequality.
37House price data is available for 1390 counties from 1989 onwards. These counties
comprise 89.5% of the total population in 1999.
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FIGURE 1.C.2.1. House price growth and income inequality change for US
counties
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Source: US Census Bureau, Federal Housing and Finance Agency, own
calculations.
Note: The red dashed line is real house prices for US counties in the top quintile
for income inequality growth. The blue line is real house prices for counties in the
bottom quintile. Growth in income inequality is measured by the change in Gini
coefficient between the first and the last year of the subperiod. The counties in each
group remain the same over time within a subperiod. To ensure comparability,
only counties where data for the Gini coefficient and house prices is available for
both subperiods are used. This corresponds to 1390 counties, which comprise
about 90% of the total population in 1999.
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1.C.3 Digging deeper: the relevance of the different quin-
tiles of the income distribution
In this section I decompose the change in income distribution into changes
in income at different quintiles. This enables me to further evaluate the
potential explanations for the relationship between house prices, mortgage
debt and income inequality.
Figure 1.D.2.1 plots the change in income inequality against the relative
income gains for each of the five income quintiles and the top 5%. The
relative income gain for quintile j in county i is the growth of mean income
in that quintile X ji relative to the mean income growth for a given county
X¯i.
xji = ∆t ln
(
X ji
X¯i
)
The figure suggests that a change rise in income inequality is associated
with both low relative income growth at the bottom 80 percent population
and high relative income growth at the top of the income distribution.
Therefore, at the cross-section, counties that experienced high increase
in income inequality saw declines for the lowest 4 income quintiles and
increases for the top income quintile relative to the mean. The message is
similar to the one from Figure 1.9.
Figure 1.D.2.2 shows the relationship between relative income gains
for different income quintiles and debt growth. Consistent with the
mechanism proposed in this paper, as long as incomes for the low quintiles
fare well, mortgage debt increases. That is, relative income gains for the
bottom 60% of the population are positively associated with mortgage
debt growth. On the other hand, the cross-sectional data suggests that
large income gains at the higher end of the income distribution, i.e. of
the top income quintile or the top 5 percent, are negatively correlated
with mortgage debt growth. Figure 1.D.2.3 implies similar dynamics by
displaying the relationship between mortgage debt growth and change in
income share of different income quintiles. At the cross-section an increase
in income shares of the top earners, i.e. top 20 % or top 5%, are negatively
correlated with debt growth. This finding contradicts explanations based
around higher income gains at the top of the distribution leading to an
increase in debt.
Figure 1.D.2.4 shows the relationship between house price growth and
relative income gains for different quintiles. Income gains at the lower end
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of the income distribution are positively related to house price growth.
This finding is consistent with the mechanism proposed in this paper,
and inconsistent with explanations that predict an increase in house prices
together with large relative gains in top incomes. Figure 1.D.2.5 confirms
this prediction by showing the relationship between house price growth
and change in income share of different income quintiles. An increase in
the income shares of top 5% and the top 20% of the income distribution is
negatively associated with house price growth.
Taking stock
The fact that higher income inequality leads to lower debt, higher delin-
quencies and lower house prices is consistent with the following expla-
nation. An increase in income inequality worsens the pool of borrowers,
in the sense that they are more likely to default. Mortgage debt falls as
lenders price in the increased risk from the change in the pool of borrowers.
This leads to lower housing demand and prices. The theoretical model
described in this paper formalizes this intuition.
1.D Robustness Checks: County level data
1.D.1 Controlling for housing supply elasticity
In this section, I first show that the empirical findings of this paper are
robust to inclusion of housing supply elasticity as a control variable. If
housing supply elasticity is a common driver of house prices and income
inequality, then it is essential to control for it to study whether income
inequality is an independent vector affecting house prices.
Figure 1.D.2.6 plots the partial correlation with the change in Gini
coefficient between 1999 and 2011 for three variables using data from US
counties. The first panel shows the relationship between the change in Gini
coefficient and real house price growth, the second the relationship with
real mortgage debt growth, and the third the relationship with the change
in the delinquency rate. In constructing this figure I control for a variety of
county characteristics including the housing supply elasticity measured by
Saiz (2010). This measure is available for a subset of counties and reduces
the sample size from 2093 to 746.38 Therefore, even when controlled for
housing supply elasticity, cross-sectional correlations qualitatively remain
38Saiz (2010) housing supply elasticity measure is available at the metropolitan
statistical area (MSA) level, I assume that the counties in the same MSA have the same
elasticity.
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the same. This is not suprising since counties with low housing supply
elasticity are on average densely populated and I control for household
size in Figure 1.2.
Next, I consider whether the relationship between income inequality
and house price growth is qualitatively different across high and low
housing supply elasticity areas. Figure 1.D.2.7 displays the correlation
between house price growth and change in income inequality without
controlling for county characteristics. I group counties into three categories
depending on their Saiz (2010) elasticity measure. First panel in Figure
1.D.2.7 corresponds to the counties at the lowest tercile of supply elasticity.
The figure shows that house price growth and change in income inequality
is negatively correlated at the cross-section, independent of the level of
supply elasticity. Figure 1.D.2.8 displays the partial correlations having
controlled for county characteristics and points into the same conclusion
as Figure 1.D.2.7. Therefore, the results in Figure 1.2 is not reflecting the
dynamics of low housing supply elasticity areas that would on average be
expected to have the largest house price changes.
Finally, Figures 1.D.2.9 and 1.D.2.10 depict that real mortgage debt
growth and change in income inequality are negatively associated in each
housing supply elasticity group both with and without controlling for
county characteristics.
1.D.2 Controlling for the share of subprime borrowers
In this section I show that the negative association of income inequality
with both house prices and mortgage debt holds for subsamples of counties
with different share of subprime credit population share as of 2000.39
I first consider whether the relationship between income inequality
and mortgage debt growth differs across high and low subprime credit
population areas. Figure 1.D.2.11 displays the simple correlations. I group
counties into three categories depending on their subprime population
share. First panel in Figure 1.D.2.11 corresponds to the counties at the
lowest tercile of subprime borrower share. The figure shows that house
price growth and change in income inequality is negatively correlated at
the cross-section, independent of the subprime population share. Figure
1.D.2.12 displays the partial correlations having controlled for county
characteristics. Similar to Figure 1.D.2.11, Figure 1.D.2.12 shows that
39The data includes a larger fraction of counties if I consider the share of subprime
credit population in year 2000 instead of year 1999.
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the association between mortgage debt and income inequality is negative
independent of the share of subprime population.
Next, I analyse whether the relationship between income inequality and
house price growth varies with the share of subprime credit population.
Figure 1.D.2.13 shows that house price growth and change in income
inequality is negatively correlated at the cross-section, independent of the
subprime population share. In this figure I display the correlations without
controlling for covariates like mean income and population growth. Figure
1.D.2.14 displays the partial correlations having controlled for county
characteristics and confirms the empirical findings of this paper for
different subsamples of US counties.
68
FIGURE 1.D.2.1. Income inequality change and quintile relative income growth between the years 1999 and 2011
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Data source: US Census Bureau.
Note: The binscatter command of Stata is used to produce this figure. The x-axis in each subplot is the income growth in each income
quintile relative to the mean income of the county. Relative income gain is grouped into 20 equally sized bins. The position of each point in the
graph is the mean value of the change in the Gini coefficient and mean value of relative income growth for one of these bins. All growth rates
and changes are calculated between the years 1999 and 2011.
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FIGURE 1.D.2.2. Real mortgage debt growth and quintile relative income growth between the years 1999 and 2011
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Data source: US Census Bureau, New York Fed Consumer Credit Panel.
Note: The x-axis in each subplot is the real income growth in each income quintile relative to the mean income of the county. The binscatter
command of Stata is used to produce this figure. Relative income gain is grouped into 20 equal bins. The locations of each point is the mean in
income gain and mortgage debt growth for the points in that bin.
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FIGURE 1.D.2.3. Real mortgage debt growth and change in quintile income share between the years 1999 and 2011
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Data source: US Census Bureau, New York Fed Consumer Credit Panel.
Note: The binscatter command of Stata is used to produce this figure. The x-axis in each subplot is the income growth in each income quintile
relative to the mean income of the county. Relative income gain is grouped into 20 equally sized bins. The position of each point in the graph is
the mean value of the mortgage debt growth and mean value of relative income growth for one of these bins. All growth rates and changes are
calculated between the years 1999 and 2011.
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FIGURE 1.D.2.4. Real house price growth and quintile relative income growth between the years 1999 and 2011
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Data source: US Census Bureau, Federal Housing and Finance Agency.
Note: The binscatter command of Stata is used to produce this figure. The x-axis in each subplot is the income growth in each income quintile
relative to the mean income of the county. Relative income gain is grouped into 20 equally sized bins. The position of each point in the graph
is the mean value of the house price growth and mean value of relative income growth for one of these bins. All growth rates and changes are
calculated between the years 1999 and 2011.
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FIGURE 1.D.2.5. Real house price growth and change in quintile income share 1999 - 2011
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Data source: US Census Bureau, Federal Housing and Finance Agency.
Note: The binscatter command of Stata is used to produce this figure. The x-axis in each subplot is the change in the income share of each
income quintile. Change in income share is grouped into 20 equally sized bins. The position of each point in the graph is the mean value of the
house price growth and mean value of change in income share for one of these bins. All growth rates and changes are calculated between the
years 1999 and 2011.
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FIGURE 1.D.2.6. Changes in income inequality, real house price growth, mortgage debt growth and change in mortgage delinquency
rate over US counties (1999-2011)
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Data source: US Census Bureau, New York Fed Consumer Credit Panel, Federal Housing and Finance Agency, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Saiz
(2010).
Note: To construct this figure I use the binscatter command in Stata . This regresses the three title variables on the change in Gini
coefficient, Saiz (2010) housing supply elasticity, state fixed effects, mean income growth, population growth, the share of subprime borrowers in
2000, median income in 1999, and the number of households in 1999. The slope of the line of fit is the coefficient for the change in Gini coefficient
in this regression. For the data points, it first obtains the residuals from regressions of the title variable and the change in Gini coefficient on the
other control variables. These are then grouped in twenty equally sized bins for the Gini coefficient residual. The position of each point is the
mean value of the title variable residual and Gini coefficient residual for one of these bins. All growth rates and changes are calculated between
the years 1999 and 2011.
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FIGURE 1.D.2.7. Changes in income inequality and real house price growth between the years 1999 and 2011 over US counties with
different housing supply elasticity
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Data source: US Census Bureau, Federal Housing and Finance Agency, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Saiz (2010).
Note: To construct this figure I use the binscatter command in Stata . Change in the Gini coefficient is grouped into 20 equally sized bins.
The position of each point is the mean value of the real house price growth and the change in Gini for one of these bins. All growth rates and
changes are calculated between the years 1999 and 2011. Counties are grouped into three according to housing supply elasticity. Low and high
correspond to the lowest and the highest Saiz (2010) housing supply elasticity terciles, respectively.
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FIGURE 1.D.2.8. Changes in income inequality and real house price growth in US counties with different housing supply elasticity
(1999-2011)
−
.
1
−
.
0
5
0
.
0
5
H
o
u
s
e
 
p
r
i
c
e
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
−.02 0 .02 .04
Change in Gini
Low Saiz (2010) elasticity
−
.
1
−
.
0
5
0
.
0
5
−.02 0 .02 .04
Change in Gini
Medium Saiz (2010) elasticity 
−
.
1
−
.
0
5
0
.
0
5
−.02 0 .02 .04
Change in Gini
High Saiz (2010) elasticity
Data source: US Census Bureau, New York Fed Consumer Credit Panel, Federal Housing and Finance Agency, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Saiz
(2010).
Note: To construct this figure I use the binscatter command in Stata . This regresses the house price growth on the change in Gini coefficient,
state fixed effects, mean income growth, population growth, the share of subprime borrowers in 2000, median income in 1999, and the number of
households in 1999 for each elasticity group. The slope of the line of fit is the coefficient for the change in Gini coefficient in this regression. For
the data points, it first obtains the residuals from regressions of real house price growth and the change in Gini coefficient on the other control
variables. These are then grouped in 20 equally sized bins for the Gini coefficient residual. The position of each point is the mean value of house
price growth residual and Gini coefficient residual for one of these bins. All growth rates and changes are calculated between the years 1999 and
2011. Counties are grouped into three according to housing supply elasticity. Low and high correspond to the lowest and the highest Saiz (2010)
housing supply elasticity terciles, respectively.
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FIGURE 1.D.2.9. Changes in income inequality and real mortgage debt growth between the years 1999 and 2011 over US counties
with different housing supply elasticity
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Data source: US Census Bureau, Federal Housing and Finance Agency, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Saiz (2010).
Note: To construct this figure I use the binscatter command in Stata . Change in the Gini coefficient is grouped into 20 equally sized bins.
The position of each point is the mean value of the real mortgage debt growth and the change in Gini for one of these bins. All growth rates and
changes are calculated between the years 1999 and 2011. Counties are grouped into three according to housing supply elasticity. Low and high
correspond to the lowest and the highest Saiz (2010) housing supply elasticity terciles, respectively.
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FIGURE 1.D.2.10. Changes in income inequality and real mortgage debt growth in US counties with different housing supply
elasticity (1999-2011)
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Data source: US Census Bureau, New York Fed Consumer Credit Panel, Federal Housing and Finance Agency, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Saiz
(2010).
Note: To construct this figure I use the binscatter command in Stata . This regresses the real mortgage debt growth on the change in Gini
coefficient, state fixed effects, mean income growth, population growth, the share of subprime borrowers in 2000, median income in 1999, and
the number of households in 1999 for each elasticity group. The slope of the line of fit is the coefficient for the change in Gini coefficient in this
regression. For the data points, it first obtains the residuals from regressions of real mortgage debt growth and the change in Gini coefficient on
the other control variables. These are then grouped in 20 equally sized bins for the Gini coefficient residual. The position of each point is the
mean value of real mortgage debt growth residual and Gini coefficient residual for one of these bins. All growth rates and changes are calculated
between the years 1999 and 2011. Counties are grouped into three according to housing supply elasticity. Low and high correspond to the lowest
and the highest Saiz (2010) housing supply elasticity terciles, respectively.
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FIGURE 1.D.2.11. Changes in income inequality and real mortgage debt growth in US counties with different initial subprime credit
population share (1999-2011)
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Data source: US Census Bureau, New York Fed Consumer Credit Panel, Federal Housing and Finance Agency, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Note: To construct this figure I use the binscatter command in Stata . Change in the Gini coefficient is grouped into 20 equally sized bins.
The position of each point is the mean value of the real mortgage debt growth and the change in Gini for one of these bins. All growth rates and
changes are calculated between the years 1999 and 2011. Counties are grouped into three according to share of subprime credit population share
as of 2000. Low and high correspond to the lowest and the highest share of subprime credit population, respectively.
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FIGURE 1.D.2.12. Changes in income inequality and real mortgage debt growth in US counties with different initial subprime credit
population share (1999-2011)
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Data source: US Census Bureau, New York Fed Consumer Credit Panel, Federal Housing and Finance Agency, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Note: To construct this figure I use the binscatter command in Stata . This regresses the house price growth on the change in Gini coefficient,
state fixed effects, mean income growth, population growth, the share of subprime borrowers in 2000, median income in 1999, and the number of
households in 1999 for each elasticity group. The slope of the line of fit is the coefficient for the change in Gini coefficient in this regression. For
the data points, it first obtains the residuals from regressions of the title variable and the change in Gini coefficient on the other control variables.
These are then grouped in 20 equally sized bins for the Gini coefficient residual. The position of each point is the mean value of the mortgage
debt growth residual and Gini coefficient residual for one of these bins. All growth rates and changes are calculated between the years 1999 and
2011. Counties are grouped into three according to share of subprime credit population share as of 2000. Low and high correspond to the lowest
and the highest share of subprime credit population, respectively.
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FIGURE 1.D.2.13. Changes in income inequality and real house price growth in US counties with different initial subprime credit
population share (1999-2011)
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Data source: US Census Bureau, New York Fed Consumer Credit Panel, Federal Housing and Finance Agency, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Note: To construct this figure I use the binscatter command in Stata . Change in the Gini coefficient is grouped into 20 equally sized bins.
The position of each point is the mean value of the real house price growth and the change in Gini for one of these bins. All growth rates and
changes are calculated between the years 1999 and 2011. Counties are grouped into three according to share of subprime credit population share
as of 2000. Low and high correspond to the lowest and the highest share of subprime credit population, respectively.
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FIGURE 1.D.2.14. Changes in income inequality and real house price growth in US counties with different initial subprime credit
population share (1999-2011)
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Data source: US Census Bureau, New York Fed Consumer Credit Panel, Federal Housing and Finance Agency, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Note: To construct this figure I use the binscatter command in Stata . This regresses the house price growth on the change in Gini coefficient,
state fixed effects, mean income growth, population growth, the share of subprime borrowers in 2000, median income in 1999, and the number of
households in 1999 for each elasticity group. The slope of the line of fit is the coefficient for the change in Gini coefficient in this regression. For
the data points, it first obtains the residuals from regressions of the title variable and the change in Gini coefficient on the other control variables.
These are then grouped in 20 equally sized bins for the Gini coefficient residual. The position of each point is the mean value of the house price
growth residual and Gini coefficient residual for one of these bins. All growth rates and changes are calculated between the years 1999 and 2011.
Counties are grouped into three according to share of subprime credit population share as of 2000. Low and high correspond to the lowest and
the highest share of subprime credit population, respectively.
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Chapter 2
Income Inequality, Mortgage Debt
and House Prices: A Panel Data
Analysis
In this chapter I study how income inequality is associated with house prices,
mortgage debt and mortgage delinquency using panel data of US states. In order to
isolate the effect of income inequality from that of the declining real rates, I use year
fixed effects in the specifications, in addition to state fixed effects and covariates
that vary both by year and state. I find that the data verifies the predictions of
the theoretical framework presented in Chapter 1 of this thesis. That is, a rise in
income inequality is associated with (i) a decline in house prices, (ii) an increase in
mortgage delinquencies and (iii) a decline in mortgage debt. Moreover, changes in
the long-term real interest rate alters the responses to changes in income inequality.
A decline in real rates mitigate the negative relation between income inequality and
house prices at the cost of amplifying association between income inequality and
mortgage delinquencies.
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2.1 Introduction
To verify the model’s predictions presented in the first chapter of this thesis,
I turn to a panel of US states. The model implies the following testable
predictions:
1. Income inequality and house prices are negatively correlated
2. Income inequality and aggregate default risk are positively correlated
3. Declining real rates mitigate the effect of rising inequality on house
prices
4. Declining real rates amplify the effect of rising inequality on aggre-
gate default risk
I use data from 1992 to 2015 for house prices, and from 2003 to 2015 for
mortgage credit and delinquency. I estimate specifications which include
time fixed effects to control for macroeconomic developments, and state
fixed effects to control for any time invariant state characteristics. I find that
a 10 percentage point increase in Gini coefficient is associated with a 16%
decline in real house prices, a 1.2 percentage point increase in the share of
delinquent mortgages, and a 10% decline in real mortgage debt per capita.1
I then examine how changes in the long-term real interest rate alters the
responses of these variables to changes in income inequality. I find that
a 100 basis point decline in the real rate mitigates the effect of inequality
on house prices by about 2.3 percentage points, and adds 0.85 percentage
points to the effect of income inequality on mortgage delinquencies.
2.2 Data description and summary statistics
In my empirical analysis I use a panel of US States. My data includes
measures of house prices, mortgage debt, mortgage delinquency, mean
income and population. I use the Federal Housing and Financing Agency
(FHFA) all transactions index to measure house prices. The FHFA
constructs this index by reviewing repeat mortgage transactions, both
purchase and refinancing, on properties whose mortgages were securitized
or bought by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac.
1Between the years 1992 and 2015, US real house prices increased by 22% and its Gini
coefficient increased by about 5 percentage points.
84
My measure of household debt data uses Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax
(CCP) data available at the state level from the New York Federal Reserve
website.2 I use the per capita balance of mortgage debt excluding home
equity lines of credit as my measure of mortgage debt. My measure of
delinquency is the percent of the mortgage debt balance that has been
delinquent for more than ninety days.
Data on resident populations, the 10-year treasury constant maturity
rate, the number if new private housing permits authorized, and mean
adjusted gross income are available from the St Louis Federal Reserve
Bank.3 I use the CPI-UR-S series from Bureau of Labor Statistics to deflate
the house price index, mortgage debt and mean adjusted gross income.4
I construct long-term real rates by subtracting 10-year inflation forecasts
from Survey of Professional Forecasters from the 10-year treasury constant
maturity rate. I find the annual forecast by taking the average of quarterly
forecasts.
The Gini coefficient is taken from Mark Frank’s website. It is con-
structed from individual tax filing data available through the Internal
Revenue Service website.5
The data set covers spans the years between 1992-2015 for house prices
and 2003-2015 for mortgage variables. It covers all US states excluding
Alaska and the District of Columbia.
2.3 Empirical Strategy and Results
This section describes my estimation strategy and presents estimation
results. To isolate the effect of income inequality on outcome variables,
I use specifications that include both state and year fixed effects. Year
fixed effects capture changes in aggregate variables that might confound
the effect of income inequality. For example, declining real interest rates,
business cycles, or an increase in the aggregate supply of credit. State
2https://www.newyorkfed.org/microeconomics/databank.html. For a detailed
description of this data set see Lee and der Klaauw (2010).
3 10-year treasury constant maturity rate is from Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System (US). New private housing permits authorized is from US Bureau of the
Census and U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. Mean adjusted gross
income series are from US Bureau of the Census.
4This series is considered to be the most detailed and systematic consistent CPI
series available. This is important as my data starts before 2000 where the series had
a methodological change.
5See Frank (2014) for the construction of Gini and other income inequality measure
for US states. Updated measures are available in http://www.shsu.edu/eco_mwf/
inequality.html
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fixed effects control for any time-invariant heterogeneity across states. This
includes any cultural, social, historical, geographic and other conditions
that remained constant within the study period. This identification strategy
is similar to a difference-in-differences approach with continuous treatment
as the remaining variation in the data is that of state and time.
I include variables that vary by state over time in order to control for
confounding effects in the state-by-time dimension. Changes in inequality
might be correlated with changes in other variables that directly affect
housing demand. For example, real mean income and population. A
rise in income inequality can result from changes in the different quintiles
of the income distribution which might give rise to an increase or a
decrease in the mean income. Therefore, to analyze whether income
inequality is an independent vector explaining the developments in the
outcome variable, I control for mean income. Including population controls
directly for aggregate housing demand and also indirectly for changes in
the demographics of a state, which could affect preferences for home-
ownership and thus housing demand. Demographics can also affect the
borrower pool. While state fixed effects can control for the time invariant
component of borrower quality, including population can be considered
as an indirect control for this type of change. Moreover, changes in
demographics can affect the income distribution in a state. Depending
on the relative incomes of movers and residents, mean income and income
inequality might increase or decrease. I include the home-ownership rate
in the model to control for cyclical changes in housing demand that can
arise from various sources such as an increase in house price expectations
or easier access to mortgage lending. If the access to lending is not
increasing homogeneously across the income distribution, its effect might
confound that of income inequality. Finally, I introduce a measure of a
change in housing supply that cannot be captured by the state fixed effects.
Developers may wish to build more houses when incomes are increasing.
This might confound the effect of income inequality especially if potential
buyers from some points of the income distribution fare better than others.
I use the following regression specification:
Ys,t = αs + αt + βGinis,t + ΓXs,t + es,t (2.1)
where Ys,t is the outcome variable, αs and αt are state and time fixed
effects, and Xs,t is a vector of time-varying state level covariates.
In order to test the joint effect of low interest rates and increasing
income inequality, I also estimate a specification which includes the
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FIGURE 2.1. Equilibrium impact of rising inequality in high and low
interest rate environments
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Note: The HH curve represents equilibrium in the housing market. The MM
curve represents equilibrium in the mortgage market for a given house price. A
mean-preserving change in income inequality shifts MM to MMhigh Gini. The
slope of the HH curve increases with the real rate.
interaction of the Gini coefficient with the real interest rate. Note that the
year fixed effects absorb all variation in the real rate itself.
Ys,t = αs + αt + βGinis,t + µGinis,t × Ratet + ΓXs,t + es,t (2.2)
Figure 2.1 provides model based guidance regarding the interaction
between inequality and the interest rate environment. The figure is a
variant of Figure 1.10 with the direct effects of the decline in the risk-
free rate eliminated or, within the context of the regression specification,
are averaged out. A negative µ coefficient implies that in high interest rate
environments, one percentage point increase in income inequality increases
the outcome variable at a lower rate.
2.3.1 Result 1: House prices decline with income inequality
Table 2.1 presents estimation results when house prices are the dependent
variable. The first column shows that, consistent with the model’s
predictions, income inequality and real house prices are negatively cor-
related. A 10 percentage point increase in income inequality is associated
with around 20% decline in house prices. Equivalently, a one standard
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TABLE 2.1. Income inequality and real house prices
Dependent variable: Log real FHFA house price index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Gini -2.138∗∗∗ -1.745∗∗∗ -1.605∗∗∗ -2.093∗∗∗ -1.793∗∗∗ -1.701∗∗∗
(0.338) (0.261) (0.242) (0.601) (0.551) (0.536)
Log real mean income 1.107∗∗∗ 1.059∗∗∗ 1.293∗∗∗ 1.251∗∗∗
(0.159) (0.143) (0.186) (0.182)
Log population 0.250∗ 0.272∗ 0.191 0.188
(0.136) (0.146) (0.216) (0.224)
Homeownership rate 0.010∗∗∗ 0.007
(0.003) (0.005)
Log new permits 0.001 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002)
year fe yes yes yes yes yes yes
state fe yes yes yes yes yes yes
population weight no no no yes yes yes
R-squared within 0.699 0.802 0.812 0.716 0.810 0.813
R-squared overall 0.163 0.235 0.162 0.166 0.318 0.274
Observations 1200 1200 1200 1200 1200 1200
Years 1992-2015 1992-2015 1992-2015 1992-2015 1992-2015 1992-2015
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation robust standard errors in parenthesis clustered at
the state level. House price index and income variables are deflated by CPI-UR-S series.
Columns (4)− (6) present population weighted estimates.
deviation increase in income inequality corresponds to a 7.7% decline in
real house prices.6 The second column shows that income inequality
remains significant when controlling for mean income and population, two
variables that are most likely to confound income inequality. In column (3)
I add two additional controls: the home-ownership rate and the number
of new private housing permits authorized. Column (3) shows that a 10
percentage point increase in income inequality is associated with a 16%
decline in real house prices. For robustness, I repeat the regressions in
columns (4)− (6) using population weights and find similar results.
Next I examine the effect of a low interest environment on the income
inequality-house price nexus. Figure 2.1 shows that a given increase in
income inequality leads to a smaller decline in house prices when the real
rate is low. The model therefore predicts that the interaction term will have
a negative coefficient.
The first column of the Table 2.2 presents estimation results when
the model is estimated without controls. The results imply that a one
6This corresponds to roughly 27% of the overall variation in real house prices for the
period analyzed.
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percentage point increase in the real interest rate increases the response of
house prices to income inequality by about half a percentage point. That is,
when the 10-year real rate is one percent, a 10 percentage points increase in
income inequality implies a decline in house prices of about 19%. Columns
(2) and (3) show that the effect of real rates remains significant when
controls are included and columns (4)-(6) show that the effect is not driven
by states with small populations.
TABLE 2.2. Income inequality and real house prices: the effect of the
interest rate environment
Dependent variable: Log real FHFA house price index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Gini -1.479∗∗∗ -1.438∗∗∗ -1.339∗∗∗ -1.429∗∗∗ -1.362∗∗∗ -1.316∗∗∗
(0.498) (0.341) (0.308) (0.400) (0.377) (0.366)
Gini x Real 10-year rate -0.547∗∗ -0.259∗ -0.228∗ -0.768∗∗∗ -0.516∗∗∗ -0.493∗∗∗
(0.214) (0.144) (0.135) (0.207) (0.179) (0.183)
Log real mean income 1.066∗∗∗ 1.025∗∗∗ 1.174∗∗∗ 1.149∗∗∗
(0.147) (0.133) (0.175) (0.166)
Log population 0.202 0.229 0.103 0.105
(0.134) (0.144) (0.205) (0.215)
Homeownership rate 0.010∗∗∗ 0.005
(0.003) (0.005)
Log new permits 0.001 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002)
year fe yes yes yes yes yes yes
state fe yes yes yes yes yes yes
population weight no no no yes yes yes
R-squared within 0.716 0.806 0.815 0.756 0.826 0.828
R-squared overall 0.160 0.280 0.190 0.148 0.424 0.378
Observations 1200 1200 1200 1200 1200 1200
Years 1992-2015 1992-2015 1992-2015 1992-2015 1992-2015 1992-2015
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation robust standard errors in parenthesis clustered at
the state level. House price index and income variables are deflated by CPI-UR-S series.
Real 10 year-rate is 10-year constant maturity treasury rate minus 10-year ahead inflation
forecasts from Survey of Professional Forecasters. Columns (4)− (6) present population
weighted estimates.
An alternative interpretation of these findings is that, in an environment
with rising income inequality, real rates must remain low to mitigate the
depressing effect of inequality on house prices. The results in column (3)
imply that, to compensate for the effect of income inequality on house
prices, the 10-year real interest rate has to decline by 6 percent. From 1992
to 2015, income inequality increased by about 5 basis points and the 10-
year real rate declined by roughly 3 percent. This fall would mitigate only
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TABLE 2.3. Income inequality and real house prices - different sample
subperiods
Dependent variable: Log real FHFA house price index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Gini -1.605∗∗∗ -2.232∗∗∗ -1.320∗∗ -1.686∗∗∗ -1.519∗∗∗
(0.243) (0.330) (0.526) (0.267) (0.318)
Log real mean income 1.060∗∗∗ 1.007∗∗∗ 0.408∗∗ 1.087∗∗∗ 0.177
(0.144) (0.181) (0.169) (0.142) (0.328)
Log population 0.272∗ 0.164 2.514∗∗∗ 0.257∗ 1.563∗
(0.146) (0.138) (0.296) (0.139) (0.876)
Homeownership rate 0.010∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.003 0.010∗∗∗ -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Log new permits -0.000 0.003 -0.001 0.000 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
year fe yes yes yes yes yes
state fe yes yes yes yes yes
R-squared within 0.812 0.851 0.754 0.810 0.632
R-squared overall 0.162 0.356 0.006 0.180 0.000
Observations 1200 800 300 1100 100
Years 1992-2015 1992-2007 2010-2015 no 2008 & 2009 2008-2009
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation robust standard errors in parenthesis clustered at
the state level. House price index and income variables are deflated by CPI-UR-S series.
half of the effect of the increase in income inequality. However, this is only
the interaction effect of the real interest rate on real house prices. Glaeser,
Gottlieb and Gyourko (2012) find that the direct effect of a one percent
decline in 10-year real rates is a roughly 7% increase in real house prices. A
back of envelope calculation suggests that the income inequality and real
interest rate developments between 1992 and 2015 together imply a 17%
increase in house prices. This is roughly three quarters of the observed
increase for this period.
Table 2.3 shows that the negative association between income inequality
and real house prices hold when we look at different subperiods of the
sample. The first column replicates the results in the third column of
Table 2.1. Note that the association between income inequality is higher
in the period before the Great Recession displayed in the second column,
compared to after as shown in the third one. This is not surprising since the
latter time period is associated with historically low levels in interest rates,
which according to my model mitigates the effect of income inequality on
house prices.
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2.3.2 Result 2: The mortgage delinquency rate increases
with income inequality
Next, I analyze how income inequality affects mortgage market stability.
Table 2.4 presents estimation results with the percent of delinquent
mortgages as the dependent variable. The results in column (1) imply that
a 10 percentage point increase in inequality is associated with a roughly
21 percentage point increase in the delinquency rate. Equivalently, a one
standard deviation increase in inequality corresponds to a 0.76 percentage
points increase in the delinquency rate. Column (2) shows that the
estimated coefficient is smaller when controlling for mean income, and
column (3) that it is smaller when controlling for other variables. Finally,
population weighted estimates lead to quantitatively similar results.
TABLE 2.4. Income inequality and mortgage delinquency
Dependent variable: Percent of Mortgage Debt Balance 90+ Days
Delinquent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Gini 20.958∗∗∗ 12.309∗∗ 12.641∗∗ 28.751∗∗ 15.382 15.995
(5.946) (4.917) (4.963) (10.729) (11.153) (9.782)
Log real mean income -13.645∗∗∗ -14.387∗∗∗ -28.249∗∗ -31.280∗∗
(4.737) (5.172) (11.926) (13.448)
Log population -0.945 -6.238
(4.753) (7.829)
Homeownership rate 0.091 0.270
(0.059) (0.194)
year fe yes yes yes yes yes yes
state fe yes yes yes yes yes yes
population weight no no no yes yes yes
R-squared within 0.625 0.674 0.677 0.625 0.704 0.714
R-squared overall 0.507 0.163 0.061 0.501 0.064 0.003
Observations 650 650 650 650 650 650
Years 2003-2015 2003-2015 2003-2015 2003-2015 2003-2015 2003-2015
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation robust standard errors in parenthesis clustered at
the state level. House price index and income variables are deflated by CPI-UR-S series.
Columns (4)− (6) present population weighted estimates.
Figure 2.1 shows that a given increase in income inequality leads to
a larger increase in equilibrium default risk when the real rate is low.
Therefore, the model predicts that the interaction term has a positive
coefficient.
Table 2.5 shows that, in high interest rate environments a one per-
centage point increase in income inequality implies a smaller increase in
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TABLE 2.5. Income Inequality and mortgage delinquency: the effect of the
interest rate environment
Dependent variable: Percent of Mortgage Debt Balance 90+ Days
Delinquent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Gini 26.822∗∗∗ 18.623∗∗∗ 19.925∗∗∗ 34.011∗∗ 20.608∗ 21.919∗∗
(8.038) (6.114) (6.143) (12.963) (12.289) (10.678)
Gini x Real 10-year rate -7.050 -7.763∗ -8.580∗ -12.943 -12.771∗∗ -14.402∗∗
(4.857) (4.149) (4.377) (8.678) (5.619) (5.522)
Log real mean income -13.870∗∗∗ -14.743∗∗∗ -28.171∗∗∗ -31.302∗∗
(4.535) (5.136) (10.340) (11.905)
Log population -3.024 -9.963
(4.723) (6.232)
Homeownership rate 0.101 0.274
(0.065) (0.206)
year fe yes yes yes yes yes yes
state fe yes yes yes yes yes yes
population weight no no no yes yes yes
R-squared within 0.632 0.683 0.687 0.642 0.720 0.734
R-squared overall 0.524 0.175 0.006 0.511 0.065 0.013
Observations 650 650 650 650 650 650
Years 2003-2015 2003-2015 2003-2015 2003-2015 2003-2015 2003-2015
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation robust standard errors in parenthesis clustered at
the state level. House price index and income variables are deflated by CPI-UR-S series.
Real 10 year-rate is 10-year constant maturity treasury rate minus 10-year ahead inflation
forecasts from Survey of Professional Forecasters. Columns (4)− (6) present population
weighted estimates.
mortgage delinquencies. Column (1) shows that a one percentage point
increase in the real interest rate implies that mortgage delinquencies rise
by 0.7 percentage points less when there is a 10 percentage point increase
in income inequality. Controlling for income and other variables reduces
the estimated effect of inequality on mortgage delinquency is reduced.
Population weighted estimates are presented in columns (4) − (6). They
imply a stronger effect of interest rates in mitigating the default risk arising
from income inequality.
Finally, I consider the relationship between income inequality and
mortgage delinquencies in different subperiods of the sample. Given
that the time period is only 13 years in this panel, these findings should
be taken with a pinch of salt. The first period replicates the finding
of Table 2.4. The second column shows that income inequality and
mortgage delinquencies are negatively associated in the period between
2003 and 2007, when the Fed has been following a contractionary monetary
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TABLE 2.6. Income inequality and mortgage delinquency - different
sample subperiods
Dependent variable: Percent of Mortgage Debt Balance 90+ Days
Delinquent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Gini 12.641∗∗ -9.575∗∗ 19.740 18.803∗∗∗ 34.339∗∗∗
(4.963) (4.202) (12.033) (5.653) (10.410)
Log real mean income -14.387∗∗∗ -4.110∗∗ -11.512 -11.289∗∗ -15.823
(5.172) (1.875) (9.302) (4.343) (13.010)
Log population -0.945 -1.103 -18.821 -2.405 -41.725
(4.753) (5.357) (17.976) (4.123) (31.597)
Homeownership rate 0.091 0.045 0.121 0.024 0.003
(0.059) (0.030) (0.086) (0.052) (0.156)
year fe yes yes yes yes yes
state fe yes yes yes yes yes
R-squared within 0.677 0.550 0.652 0.692 0.772
R-squared overall 0.061 0.000 0.062 0.033 0.139
Observations 650 250 300 550 100
Years 2003-2015 2003-2007 2010 -2015 no 2008 & 2009 2008-2009
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation robust standard errors in parenthesis clustered at
the state level. House price index and income variables are deflated by CPI-UR-S series.
policy. Note that my model implies that low interest rate environments
amplify the implications of income inequality on mortgage delinquencies,
therefore, the environment with rising interest rates might have overturned
the effect in the period before the 2008-2009 financial crisis. The regression
results in the subperiod including the financial crisis and thus low interest
rate episodes show positive associations between income inequality and
mortgage delinquencies. Column 4 shows that even when 2008-2009 period
is excluded, the finding holds.
2.3.3 Result 3: Mortgage debt declines with income in-
equality
I next investigate whether the estimates using state data are consistent
with those using county data. Recall that, in county data, an increase
in income inequality was correlated with a decrease in lending. The
estimates presented in table 2.7 imply that, for state data, an increase
in inequality is associated with a decline in mortgage lending. The
estimate in column (1) implies that a 10 percentage points increase in
the Gini coefficient is associated with a 13.7% decline in real mortgage
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TABLE 2.7. Income inequality and real mortgage debt
Dependent variable: Real Mortgage Debt Balance per Capita (excluding
HELOC)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Gini -1.374∗∗∗ -0.949∗∗∗ -1.016∗∗∗ -1.332∗∗∗ -1.029∗∗ -1.004∗∗
(0.316) (0.237) (0.237) (0.417) (0.422) (0.404)
Log real mean income 0.675∗∗∗ 0.616∗∗∗ 0.642∗∗∗ 0.512∗∗
(0.104) (0.098) (0.153) (0.205)
Log population 0.634∗∗ 0.404
(0.252) (0.322)
Homeownership rate 0.009∗ 0.013
(0.004) (0.008)
year fe yes yes yes yes yes yes
state fe yes yes yes yes yes yes
population weight no no no yes yes yes
R-squared within 0.725 0.773 0.791 0.770 0.795 0.809
R-squared overall 0.060 0.484 0.051 0.061 0.450 0.053
Observations 649 649 649 649 649 649
Years 2003-2015 2003-2015 2003-2015 2003-2015 2003-2015 2003-2015
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation robust standard errors in parenthesis clustered at
the state level. House price index and income variables are deflated by CPI-UR-S series.
Columns (4)− (6) present population weighted estimates.
debt per capita. The negative relationship between mortgage debt and
income inequality is robust to controlling for other variables and estimating
population weighted specifications.
I next examine whether the debt-inequality relationship varies with the
interest rate. Results are reported in Table 2.8. I find no significant effect of
the real rate across all the different specifications.
Finally, I study the robustness of the negative association between
income inequality and mortgage debt in different subsamples. Table 2.9
displays the estimation results. The first column displays the results for the
full sample. I find that in the run-up to the crisis the negative association
between mortgage debt and income inequality is stronger than the case
with the full sample, however, it is insignificant in the period after the
crisis. The latter period also corresponds to a low interest rate environment
which might have mitigated the effect of inequality on mortgage debt.
2.3.4 A further reality check: a cross-section of US states
Figures 2.2 to 2.4 display the results of between regressions of real house
price growth, real mortgage debt growth and the change in mortgage
delinquency on the change in income inequality, respectively. These figures
94
TABLE 2.8. Income Inequality and mortgage debt: the effect of the interest
rate environment
Dependent variable: Real Mortgage Debt Balance per Capita (excluding
HELOC)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Gini -1.384∗∗∗ -0.987∗∗∗ -1.120∗∗∗ -1.334∗∗∗ -1.029∗∗ -1.024∗∗
(0.440) (0.321) (0.332) (0.472) (0.478) (0.460)
Gini x Real 10-year rate 0.013 0.046 0.122 0.004 0.000 0.048
(0.241) (0.183) (0.185) (0.323) (0.247) (0.236)
Log real mean income 0.676∗∗∗ 0.621∗∗∗ 0.642∗∗∗ 0.512∗∗
(0.102) (0.095) (0.154) (0.209)
Log population 0.664∗∗ 0.416
(0.264) (0.334)
Homeownership rate 0.008∗ 0.013
(0.004) (0.008)
year fe yes yes yes yes yes yes
state fe yes yes yes yes yes yes
population weight no no no yes yes yes
R-squared within 0.725 0.773 0.792 0.770 0.795 0.809
R-squared overall 0.060 0.482 0.049 0.061 0.450 0.052
Observations 649 649 649 649 649 649
Years 2003-2015 2003-2015 2003-2015 2003-2015 2003-2015 2003-2015
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation robust standard errors in parenthesis clustered at
the state level. House price index and income variables are deflated by CPI-UR-S series.
Real 10 year-rate is 10-year constant maturity treasury rate minus 10-year ahead inflation
forecasts from Survey of Professional Forecasters. Columns (4)− (6) present population
weighted estimates.
provide a visual representation of the state level variation in the panel.
All variables are normalised average annual changes between 2003-2015.
That is, each value is computed by subtracting the mean value for a state
from the average annual change of the variable, and then dividing by
the standard deviation. For example, Nevada and New York experienced
increases in income inequality about two standard deviations greater than
the mean increase across states, while the District of Columbia saw an
average annual real house price growth that is about three standard
deviations above the mean over states for this time period. Qualitatively,
Figures 2.2 to 2.4 display results in line with those for US counties depicted
in Figure 1.2, despite the source of the Gini coefficient being different and
averages being calculated over a larger number of time periods.7
7County level data gives the growth between the years 1999 and 2011, whereas state
level data is an average of 13 annual changes. County level inequality data is calculated
from Census Surveys, whereas state level inequality data is calculated from IRS tax
returns.
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FIGURE 2.2. Between regression result: income inequality and real house
prices
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Data source: New York Fed Consumer Credit Panel, Federal Housing and Finance
Agency, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
This figure uses the normalized average annual change of each variable. For the Gini
coefficient, for instance, it is calculated as follows. I first compute the annual change in
the Gini coefficient for each year between 2003 to 2015. I then calculate the average change
for each state and the across state mean and standard deviation of average changes. The
value for each state is its average change in Gini coefficient net of the across state mean
and divided by the across state standard deviation. A state that takes value 2 in the x-axis
of each panel experienced an increase in income inequality 2 standard deviations above
that of the across state mean. The slope of the regression line is the estimated coefficient
of a between regression estimated of each variable on the change in the Gini coefficient.
Both the dependent variable and the Gini coefficient are normalized annual changes.
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FIGURE 2.3. Between regression result: income inequality and mortgage
debt
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Data source: New York Fed Consumer Credit Panel, Federal Housing and Finance
Agency, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
This figure uses the normalized average annual change of each variable. For the Gini
coefficient, for instance, it is calculated as follows. I first compute the annual change in
the Gini coefficient for each year between 2003 to 2015. I then calculate the average change
for each state and the across state mean and standard deviation of average changes. The
value for each state is its average change in Gini coefficient net of the across state mean
and divided by the across state standard deviation. A state that takes value 2 in the x-axis
of each panel experienced an increase in income inequality 2 standard deviations above
that of the across state mean. The slope of the regression line is the estimated coefficient
of a between regression estimated of each variable on the change in the Gini coefficient.
Both the dependent variable and the Gini coefficient are normalized annual changes.
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FIGURE 2.4. Between regression result: income inequality and mortgage
delinquency rate
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Data source: New York Fed Consumer Credit Panel, Federal Housing and Finance
Agency, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
This figure uses the normalized average annual change of each variable. For the Gini
coefficient, for instance, it is calculated as follows. I first compute the annual change in
the Gini coefficient for each year between 2003 to 2015. I then calculate the average change
for each state and the across state mean and standard deviation of average changes. The
value for each state is its average change in Gini coefficient net of the across state mean
and divided by the across state standard deviation. A state that takes value 2 in the x-axis
of each panel experienced an increase in income inequality 2 standard deviations above
that of the across state mean. The slope of the regression line is the estimated coefficient
of a between regression estimated of each variable on the change in the Gini coefficient.
Both the dependent variable and the Gini coefficient are normalized annual changes.
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TABLE 2.9. Income inequality and mortgage debt - different sample
subperiods
Dependent variable: Real Mortgage Debt Balance per Capita (excluding
HELOC)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Gini -1.016∗∗∗ -1.904∗∗∗ 0.337 -0.973∗∗∗ -0.432∗∗
(0.237) (0.555) (0.456) (0.240) (0.204)
Log real mean income 0.616∗∗∗ 0.004 -0.194 0.709∗∗∗ 0.315
(0.098) (0.144) (0.232) (0.103) (0.211)
Log population 0.634∗∗ 0.802 0.767 0.551∗∗ 1.631∗∗∗
(0.252) (0.483) (0.736) (0.252) (0.540)
Homeownership rate 0.009∗ 0.001 0.002 0.006 0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
year fe yes yes yes yes yes
state fe yes yes yes yes yes
R-squared within 0.791 0.865 0.785 0.753 0.580
R-squared overall 0.051 0.054 0.002 0.066 0.028
Observations 649 249 300 549 100
Years 2003-2015 2003-2007 2010 -2015 no 2008 & 2009 2008-2009
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation robust standard errors in parenthesis clustered at
the state level. House price index and income variables are deflated by CPI-UR-S series.
2.3.5 Robustness check: other measures of income inequal-
ity
The model’s theoretical predictions relate housing and mortgage market
developments to that of the Gini coefficient as the measure of income
inequality. In this section, I test whether the empirical findings are robust
under different measures of income inequality. Additional measures of
income inequality considered are relative mean income deviation, Atkinson
index, Theil’s entropy index and income shares of top 10%, 5% and
1% of the income distribution.8 Note that, income inequality measures
other than the top income shares considers the entirety of the income
distribution similar to the Gini coefficient. The purpose of this section
is to provide a robustness analysis, rather than taking a stance on what the
best measure of income inequality is in explaining housing and mortgage
market dynamics.9 I use the same empirical specifications of 2.1 and 2.2
with state fixed effects, year fixed effects and controls.
8All measures are available at Mark Frank’s income inequality website https://www.
shsu.edu/eco_mwf/inequality.html.
9Frank (2014) describes how each inequality measure is calculated and Table 2.2
displays their summary statistics.
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First, I document that the negative association between income in-
equality and house prices is robust under different measures of income
inequality. Table 2.5 provides the estimation results. Column (1) replicates
the finding from column (3) of Table 2.1 in which mean income, population,
home-ownership rate and new housing permits are included as controls.
In particular, it is worth noting that a rise in top income shares is associates
with declines in house prices rather than an increase. This finding goes
against the explanations of local house price movements related to rich
getting richer and pushing house prices up in a given location. Similarly,
Figure 1.D.2.5 provides county level evidence negating the effect of high
income quintiles in determining house price developments. Table 2.6
validates the finding that when the real interest rate is low, the effect
of an increase in income inequality corresponds to a small decline in
house prices. That is, the coefficient of the interaction term is negative
for each of the income inequality measure employed in the regressions,
although statistically significant only for the Gini coefficient and relative
mean deviation.
Second, I look at the association between mortgage delinquencies
and income inequality measures and their interaction with the real rate.
Table 2.7 shows the estimation results. Among all alternative inequality
measures other than the Gini coefficient, only relative mean income
deviation implies a positive association between income inequality and
mortgage delinquencies. The mechanism in this paper suggests that a
mean preserving increase in the Gini coefficient gives rise to an increase
in the aggregate mortgage default risk. This is because a rise in inequality
is associated with an increase in the share of population below a threshold
income level that determines the selection into risky loans. A mean
preserving increase in relative mean deviation can be associated with
decreases in incomes below the mean and decreases in incomes above the
mean, without changing their population shares. If that is the case then the
model would imply that a rise in income inequality should not affect risk in
the mortgage market. Alternatively, an increase in relative mean deviation
could arise due to polarization of income via increase in population shares
of both low and high income households. My model in this case implies
that a rise in relative mean income deviation should give rise to an increase
in the share of risky borrowers, which is the finding in Column (2) of Table
2.7.10 As far as top income shares are concerned, the estimation results
10Table 2.4 shows that Gini coefficient has the highest Spearman correlation with
relative mean income deviation.
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in the last three columns of Table 2.7 show that an increase in top income
shares is associated with a decline in mortgage delinquencies. While this
finding is interesting in its own right, the analytical model employed in
this paper might not include all potential channels that can relate the top
incomes to housing and mortgage market dynamics.11 Similar to the Gini
coefficient, Theil’s and Atkinson indices are measures of inequality for the
entirety of the income distribution. Frank (2014) computes the Atkinson
index with an inequality aversion parameter that is more sensitive to
inequality at the upper income levels and the negative association between
income inequality and mortgage delinquencies might be consistent with
mechanisms that cannot be addressed with current modeling framework.12
Lastly, I consider how interest rate environment alter the effect of rising
income inequality in mortgage delinquency rate. I find that the interaction
term is negative and statistically significant across all income inequality
measures implying a rise in real rates contribute to financial stability for a
given level of income inequality.
Finally, estimation results in Table 2.9 confirms the third empirical
contribution of this paper that an increase in income inequality is as-
sociated with a decline in mortgage debt. It’s worth noting that the
relationship between top income shares and mortgage debt implies that
the data is not supportive of the supply side mechanism proposed by
Kumhof, Rancière and Winant (2015) at the state level. This evidence still
should not be interpreted as a rejection of their theory as the mortgage
market does not face the same geographic segmentation as the housing
market and mortgage markets. This is particularly the case for the period I
consider as it is after the deregulation in the banking sector in the US that
allowed nationwide interstate banking.13 Year fixed effects in my empirical
specification allows me to control for any time varying development that
would give rise to an increase in the availability of credit at the national
level, including that of rising income inequality at the national level as is
11Note also that the mechanism in my model works through income levels not income
shares and thus a one-to-one mapping as is the case with relative mean deviation is not
straight forward. A rise in the top income shares might arise such that incomes increase
across the income distribution and population below the income risk cut-off decline and
thus risk in the mortgage market also declines.
12The relationship between supply of credit and income inequality cannot be addressed
with my model. Kumhof, Rancière and Winant (2015) employs a mechanism in which an
increase in top 5 % income share gives rise to an increase in the supply of credit and
this increases the crisis risk in the economy. Thus at the cross-section a within state
interpretation of this mechanism might not hold.
13 The Riegle-Neal Act allowed the banks hold nationwide branch networks after mid
1997.
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the case discussed in Kumhof, Rancière and Winant (2015). In Table 2.10
I show that the level of interest rates does not alter the effect of income
inequality on mortgage debt in a statistically significant way, no matter
which income inequality measure is considered.
2.4 Conclusions
Income inequality, real house prices and household debt have increased
enormously in the US in the last few decades. In this chapter I conduct
a panel data analysis that controls for national developments, including
declining real rates to study the empirical relationship between income
inequality and housing and mortgage markets. I find that a rise income
inequality is associated with (i) a decline in house prices, (ii) an increase
in mortgage delinquencies and (iii) a decline in mortgage debt. While this
finding is at odds with aggregate trends in the US, it verifies the predictions
of the theoretical model in Chapter 1 of this thesis.
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TABLE 2.1. Panel data summary statistics: US states (1992-2015)
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Max Observations
Log real FHFA house price overall -0.059 0.288 -0.743 0.906 N = 1200
between 0.244 -0.523 0.564 n = 50
within 0.158 -0.561 0.490 T = 24
Gini overall 0.589 0.036 0.521 0.711 N = 1200
between 0.026 0.550 0.651 n = 50
within 0.026 0.533 0.698 T = 24
Log real mean income overall 5.188 0.170 4.770 5.755 N = 1200
between 0.147 4.899 5.602 n = 50
within 0.088 4.904 5.505 T = 24
Log population overall 8.174 1.016 6.139 10.572 N = 1200
between 1.022 6.248 10.460 n = 50
within 0.085 7.698 8.471 T = 24
Home ownership rate overall 68.104 6.429 35.000 81.300 N = 1200
between 6.059 42.417 76.433 n = 50
within 2.305 60.467 73.484 T = 24
Log new housing permits overall 9.343 1.136 6.358 12.279 N = 1200
between 0.244 8.581 10.163 n = 50
within 1.110 6.261 12.334 T = 24
Real 10-year rate 1.900 1.273 -0.629 3.658 T = 24
Population in 2015 (thousands) 6406 7150 586 39032 n = 50
Source: FHFA and US Census Bureau.
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TABLE 2.2. Panel data summary statistics of income inequality measures:
US states (1992-2015)
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Max Observations
Log real FHFA house price overall -0.059 0.288 -0.743 0.906 N = 1200
between 0.244 -0.523 0.564 n = 50
within 0.158 -0.561 0.490 T = 24
Gini overall 0.589 0.036 0.521 0.711 N = 1200
between 0.026 0.550 0.651 n = 50
within 0.026 0.533 0.698 T = 24
Atkinson’s entropy index overall 0.273 0.038 0.207 0.411 N = 1200
between 0.030 0.227 0.360 n = 50
within 0.023 0.192 0.348 T = 24
Relative mean deviation overall 0.827 0.052 0.728 1.016 N = 1200
between 0.040 0.763 0.931 n = 50
within 0.034 0.720 0.916 T = 24
Theil’s index overall 0.796 0.189 0.443 1.498 N = 1200
between 0.166 0.554 1.251 n = 50
within 0.094 0.434 1.193 T = 24
Top 10% income share overall 43.258 5.004 32.241 62.171 N = 1200
between 4.043 36.013 54.278 n = 50
within 3.000 33.431 52.951 T = 24
Top 5% income share overall 31.683 5.069 21.421 54.430 N = 1200
between 4.186 24.981 44.273 n = 50
within 2.918 19.366 41.840 T = 24
Top 1% income share overall 16.853 4.510 9.017 36.069 N = 1200
between 3.701 12.137 27.547 n = 50
within 2.629 6.668 26.823 T = 24
Source: FHFA and Frank (2014).
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TABLE 2.3. Panel data summary statistics: US states (2003-2015)
Variable Mean Std. dev Min Max Observations
Log real mortgage debt per capita overall 4.496778 0.368 3.510 5.438 N = 650
between 0.354 3.751 5.178 n = 50
within 0.112 4.093 4.883 T -bar = 12.98
Share of delinquent mortgages overall 3.049892 2.649 0.300 20.740 N = 650
between 1.447 0.945 9.225 n = 50
within 2.227 -5.485 14.565 T = 13
Gini overall 0.605039 0.035 0.536 0.711 N = 650
between 0.029 0.558 0.680 n = 50
within 0.021 0.551 0.682 T = 13
Atkinson’s entropy index overall 0.286967 0.037 0.216 0.411 N = 650
between 0.035 0.235 0.387 n = 50
within 0.015 0.243 0.341 T = 13
Relative mean deviation overall 0.85041 0.049 0.738 1.016 N = 650
between 0.045 0.779 0.974 n = 50
within 0.020 0.776 0.909 T = 13
Theil’s index overall 0.839338 0.204 0.443 1.498 N = 650
between 0.190 0.564 1.373 n = 50
within 0.078 0.591 1.152 T = 13
Top 10% income share overall 45.00692 4.942 34.401 62.171 N = 650
between 4.503 37.227 57.660 n = 50
within 2.125 36.444 51.683 T = 13
Top 5% income share overall 33.25482 5.147 23.262 54.430 N = 650
between 4.801 25.960 48.006 n = 50
within 1.965 26.178 40.551 T = 13
Top 1% income share overall 18.08757 4.611 10.620 36.069 N = 650
between 4.217 12.767 30.816 n = 50
within 1.951 11.700 25.006 T = 13
Source: NY Fed Consumer Credit Panel and Frank (2014).
TABLE 2.4. Spearman correlations between income inequality measures:
US states (2003-2015)
Gini
Theil’s
entropy
index
Relative
mean
deviation
Atkinson’s
index
Top 10%
income
share
Top 5%
income
share
Top 1%
income
share
Gini 1
Theil’s entropy index 0.495 1
Relative mean deviation 0.736 0.850 1
Atkinson’s index 0.479 0.979 0.825 1
Top 10% income share 0.560 0.668 0.779 0.654 1
Top 5% income share 0.598 0.850 0.826 0.849 0.898 1
Top 1% income share 0.608 0.905 0.787 0.905 0.764 0.934 1
Source: Frank (2014).
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TABLE 2.5. Income inequality and real house prices with different
measures of income inequality
Dependent variable: Log real FHFA house price index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Gini -1.605∗∗∗
(0.243)
Relative mean devia-
tion
-1.177∗∗∗
(0.419)
Atkinson index -0.854∗
(0.493)
Theil’s entropy index -0.225∗∗
(0.092)
Top 10% income share -0.014∗∗∗
(0.002)
Top 5% income share -0.013∗∗∗
(0.003)
Top 1% income share -0.017∗∗∗
(0.004)
year fe yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
state fe yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
population weight no no no no no no no
R-squared within 0.812 0.795 0.790 0.792 0.808 0.802 0.804
R-squared overall 0.162 0.157 0.186 0.186 0.158 0.174 0.184
Observations 1200 1200 1200 1200 1200 1200 1200
Years 1992-2015 1992-2015 1992-2015 1992-2015 1992-2015 1992-2015 1992-2015
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation robust standard errors in parenthesis clustered
at the state level. Control variables are log real mean income, log population, home-
ownership rate and log new housing permits. House price index and income variables
are deflated by CPI-UR-S series.
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TABLE 2.6. Income inequality and real house prices with different
measures of income inequality: the effect of the interest rate environment
Dependent variable: Log real FHFA house price index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Gini -1.339∗∗∗
(0.310)
Gini x Real 10-year
rate
-0.229∗
(0.134)
Relative mean devia-
tion
-1.155∗∗∗
(0.417)
Relative mean devia-
tion x Real 10-year
rate
-0.189∗∗
(0.093)
Atkinson index -0.726
(0.522)
Atkinson index x Real
10-year rate
-0.166
(0.131)
Theil’s entropy index -0.205∗∗
(0.096)
Theil’s entropy index
x Real 10-year rate
-0.025
(0.023)
Top 10% income share -0.013∗∗∗
(0.003)
Top 10% income share
x Real 10-year rate
-0.001
(0.001)
Top 5% income share 0.007∗∗
(0.003)
Top 5% income share
x Real 10-year rate
-0.001
(0.002)
Top 1% income share -0.015∗∗∗
(0.004)
Top 1% income share
x Real 10-year rate
-0.001
(0.001)
year fe yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
state fe yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
population weight no no no no no no no
R-squared within 0.815 0.799 0.791 0.793 0.811 0.658 0.805
R-squared overall 0.190 0.177 0.201 0.201 0.173 0.238 0.201
Observations 1200 1200 1200 1200 1200 1200 1200
Years 1992-2015 1992-2015 1992-2015 1992-2015 1992-2015 1992-2015 1992-2015
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation robust standard errors in parenthesis clustered
at the state level. Control variables are log real mean income, log population, home-
ownership rate and log new housing permits. House price index and income variables
are deflated by CPI-UR-S series. Real 10 year-rate is 10-year constant maturity treasury
rate minus 10-year ahead inflation forecasts from Survey of Professional Forecasters.
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TABLE 2.7. Income inequality and mortgage delinquency with alternative
measures of income inequality
Dependent variable: Percent of Mortgage Debt Balance 90+ Days
Delinquent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Gini 12.641∗∗
(4.963)
Relative mean devia-
tion
1.896
(10.175)
Atkinson index -30.923∗∗
(12.508)
Theil’s entropy index -5.715∗∗
(2.237)
Top 10% income share -0.109∗
(0.054)
Top 5% income share -0.079
(0.064)
Top 1% income share -0.048
(0.087)
year fe yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
state fe yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
population weight no no no no no no no
R-squared within 0.677 0.668 0.675 0.676 0.672 0.669 0.668
R-squared overall 0.061 0.087 0.000 0.002 0.049 0.059 0.066
Observations 650 650 650 650 650 650 650
Years 2003-2015 2003-2015 2003-2015 2003-2015 2003-2015 2003-2015 2003-2015
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation robust standard errors in parenthesis clustered
at the state level. Control variables are log real mean income, log population and home-
ownership rate. House price index and income variables are deflated by CPI-UR-S series.
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TABLE 2.8. Income inequality and mortgage delinquency with alternative
measures of income inequality: the effect of the interest rate environment
Dependent variable: Percent of Mortgage Debt Balance 90+ Days
Delinquent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Gini 19.925∗∗∗
(6.143)
Gini x Real 10-year
rate
-8.580∗
(4.377)
Relative mean devia-
tion
-5.045
(8.492)
Relative mean devia-
tion x Real 10-year
rate
-9.658∗∗∗
(2.491)
Atkinson index -22.249∗
(11.917)
Atkinson index x Real
10-year rate
-11.763∗∗∗
(3.196)
Theil’s entropy index -4.152∗
(2.180)
Theil’s entropy index
x Real 10-year rate
-2.131∗∗∗
(0.594)
Top 10% income share -0.081
(0.064)
Top 10% income share
x Real 10-year rate
-0.091∗∗∗
(0.023)
Top 5% income share -0.175∗∗
(0.081)
Top 5% income share
x Real 10-year rate
-0.102∗∗∗
(0.027)
Top 1% income share -0.051
(0.092)
Top 1% income share
x Real 10-year rate
-0.094∗∗∗
(0.029)
year fe yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
state fe yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
population weight no no no no no no no
R-squared within 0.687 0.694 0.702 0.703 0.698 0.672 0.694
R-squared overall 0.006 0.000 0.007 0.005 0.029 0.138 0.002
Observations 650 650 650 650 650 650 650
Years 2003-2015 2003-2015 2003-2015 2003-2015 2003-2015 2003-2015 2003-2015
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation robust standard errors in parenthesis clustered
at the state level. Control variables are log real mean income, log population and home-
ownership rate. House price index and income variables are deflated by CPI-UR-S series.
Real 10 year-rate is 10-year constant maturity treasury rate minus 10-year ahead inflation
forecasts from Survey of Professional Forecasters.
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TABLE 2.9. Income inequality and mortgage debt with alternative
measures of income inequality
Dependent variable: Real Mortgage Debt Balance per Capita (excluding
HELOC)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Gini -1.016∗∗∗
(0.237)
Relative mean devia-
tion
-2.506∗∗∗
(0.454)
Atkinson index -2.352∗∗∗
(0.603)
Theil’s entropy index -0.411∗∗∗
(0.117)
Top 10% income share -0.018∗∗∗
(0.002)
Top 5% income share -0.023∗∗∗
(0.002)
Top 1% income share -0.025∗∗∗
(0.003)
year fe yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
state fe yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
population weight no no no no no no no
R-squared within 0.791 0.803 0.786 0.786 0.815 0.830 0.821
R-squared overall 0.051 0.059 0.128 0.103 0.099 0.102 0.114
Observations 649 649 649 649 649 649 649
Years 2003-2015 2003-2015 2003-2015 2003-2015 2003-2015 2003-2015 2003-2015
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation robust standard errors in parenthesis clustered
at the state level. Control variables are log real mean income, log population and home-
ownership rate. House price index and income variables are deflated by CPI-UR-S series.
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TABLE 2.10. Income inequality and mortgage debt with alternative
measures of income inequality: the effect of the interest rate environment
Dependent variable: Real Mortgage Debt Balance per Capita (excluding
HELOC)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Gini -1.120∗∗∗
(0.332)
Gini x Real 10-year
rate
0.122
(0.185)
Relative mean devia-
tion
-2.496∗∗∗
(0.440)
Relative mean devia-
tion x Real 10-year
rate
0.014
(0.110)
Atkinson index -2.498∗∗∗
(0.638)
Atkinson index x Real
10-year rate
0.198
(0.158)
Theil’s entropy index -0.435∗∗∗
(0.125)
Theil’s entropy index
x Real 10-year rate
0.034
(0.031)
Top 10% income share -0.018∗∗∗
(0.002)
Top 10% income share
x Real 10-year rate
0.001
(0.001)
Top 5% income share -0.010∗∗∗
(0.003)
Top 5% income share
x Real 10-year rate
0.003∗
(0.002)
Top 1% income share -0.025∗∗∗
(0.003)
Top 1% income share
x Real 10-year rate
0.000
(0.001)
year fe yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
state fe yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
population weight no no no no no no no
R-squared within 0.792 0.803 0.789 0.789 0.816 0.703 0.821
R-squared overall 0.049 0.058 0.108 0.089 0.094 0.016 0.113
Observations 649 649 649 649 649 649 649
Years 2003-2015 2003-2015 2003-2015 2003-2015 2003-2015 2003-2015 2003-2015
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation robust standard errors in parenthesis clustered
at the state level. Control variables are log real mean income, log population and home-
ownership rate. House price index and income variables are deflated by CPI-UR-S series.
Real 10 year-rate is 10-year constant maturity treasury rate minus 10-year ahead inflation
forecasts from Survey of Professional Forecasters.
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2.A Additional panel regression results with all
measures of income inequality
TABLE 2.A.1. Income inequality and real house prices with different
measures of income inequality
Dependent variable: Log real FHFA house price index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Gini -1.701∗∗∗
(0.538)
Relative mean devia-
tion
-0.626
(0.676)
Atkinson index -0.632
(0.658)
Theil’s entropy index -0.208
(0.126)
Top 10% income share -0.013∗∗∗
(0.004)
Top 5% income share -0.009∗∗
(0.004)
Top 1% income share -0.013∗∗
(0.006)
year fe yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
state fe yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
population weight yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R-squared within 0.813 0.794 0.793 0.794 0.806 0.798 0.801
R-squared overall 0.274 0.299 0.315 0.321 0.291 0.321 0.330
Observations 1200 1200 1200 1200 1200 1200 1200
Years 1992-2015 1992-2015 1992-2015 1992-2015 1992-2015 1992-2015 1992-2015
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation robust standard errors in parenthesis clustered
at the state level. Control variables are log real mean income, log population, home-
ownership rate and log new housing permits. House price index and income variables
are deflated by CPI-UR-S series.
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TABLE 2.A.2. Income inequality and real house prices with different
measures of income inequality: the effect of the interest rate environment
Dependent variable: Log real FHFA house price index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Gini -1.317∗∗∗
(0.368)
Gini x Real 10-year
rate
-0.493∗∗∗
(0.183)
Relative mean devia-
tion
-0.840
(0.728)
Relative mean devia-
tion x Real 10-year
rate
-0.301∗
(0.152)
Atkinson index -0.691
(0.547)
Atkinson index x Real
10-year rate
-0.360∗∗
(0.136)
Theil’s entropy index -0.220∗∗
(0.091)
Theil’s entropy index
x Real 10-year rate
-0.069∗∗∗
(0.023)
Top 10% income share -0.010∗∗∗
(0.003)
Top 10% income share
x Real 10-year rate
-0.003∗∗∗
(0.001)
Top 5% income share 0.013∗∗∗
(0.003)
Top 5% income share
x Real 10-year rate
-0.002∗
(0.001)
Top 1% income share -0.013∗∗∗
(0.004)
Top 1% income share
x Real 10-year rate
-0.003∗∗∗
(0.001)
year fe yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
state fe yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
population weight yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R-squared within 0.828 0.804 0.800 0.802 0.816 0.704 0.812
R-squared overall 0.378 0.392 0.366 0.375 0.331 0.253 0.378
Observations 1200 1200 1200 1200 1200 1200 1200
Years 1992-2015 1992-2015 1992-2015 1992-2015 1992-2015 1992-2015 1992-2015
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation robust standard errors in parenthesis clustered
at the state level. Control variables are log real mean income, log population, home-
ownership rate and log new housing permits. House price index and income variables
are deflated by CPI-UR-S series. Real 10 year-rate is 10-year constant maturity treasury
rate minus 10-year ahead inflation forecasts from Survey of Professional Forecasters.
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TABLE 2.A.3. Income inequality and mortgage delinquency with
alternative measures of income inequality
Dependent variable: Percent of Mortgage Debt Balance 90+ Days
Delinquent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Gini 15.995
(9.782)
Relative mean devia-
tion
7.823
(19.916)
Atkinson index -35.297
(30.378)
Theil’s entropy index -6.512
(5.583)
Top 10% income share -0.236∗∗
(0.107)
Top 5% income share -0.138
(0.117)
Top 1% income share -0.038
(0.170)
year fe yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
state fe yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
population weight yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R-squared within 0.714 0.708 0.712 0.712 0.717 0.710 0.708
R-squared overall 0.003 0.003 0.013 0.011 0.007 0.005 0.005
Observations 650 650 650 650 650 650 650
Years 2003-2015 2003-2015 2003-2015 2003-2015 2003-2015 2003-2015 2003-2015
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation robust standard errors in parenthesis clustered
at the state level. Control variables are log real mean income, log population and home-
ownership rate. House price index and income variables are deflated by CPI-UR-S series.
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TABLE 2.A.4. Income inequality and mortgage delinquency with
alternative measures of income inequality: the effect of the interest rate
environment
Dependent variable: Percent of Mortgage Debt Balance 90+ Days
Delinquent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Gini 21.919∗∗
(10.678)
Gini x Real 10-year
rate
-14.402∗∗
(5.522)
Relative mean devia-
tion
-22.733
(16.104)
Relative mean devia-
tion x Real 10-year
rate
-14.336∗∗∗
(2.681)
Atkinson index -44.724∗∗
(18.350)
Atkinson index x Real
10-year rate
-18.728∗∗∗
(3.893)
Theil’s entropy index -7.978∗∗
(3.403)
Theil’s entropy index
x Real 10-year rate
-3.473∗∗∗
(0.688)
Top 10% income share -0.202∗∗
(0.093)
Top 10% income share
x Real 10-year rate
-0.126∗∗∗
(0.022)
Top 5% income share -0.388∗∗∗
(0.144)
Top 5% income share
x Real 10-year rate
-0.147∗∗∗
(0.033)
Top 1% income share -0.144
(0.145)
Top 1% income share
x Real 10-year rate
-0.143∗∗∗
(0.022)
year fe yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
state fe yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
population weight yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R-squared within 0.734 0.744 0.752 0.755 0.751 0.712 0.745
R-squared overall 0.013 0.021 0.025 0.023 0.011 0.057 0.013
Observations 650 650 650 650 650 650 650
Years 2003-2015 2003-2015 2003-2015 2003-2015 2003-2015 2003-2015 2003-2015
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation robust standard errors in parenthesis clustered
at the state level. Control variables are log real mean income, log population and home-
ownership rate. House price index and income variables are deflated by CPI-UR-S series.
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TABLE 2.A.5. Income inequality and mortgage debt with alternative
measures of income inequality
Dependent variable: Real Mortgage Debt Balance per Capita (excluding
HELOC)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Gini -1.004∗∗
(0.404)
Relative mean devia-
tion
-2.467∗∗∗
(0.723)
Atkinson index -3.032∗∗∗
(1.063)
Theil’s entropy index -0.566∗∗∗
(0.188)
Top 10% income share -0.023∗∗∗
(0.003)
Top 5% income share -0.026∗∗∗
(0.003)
Top 1% income share -0.027∗∗∗
(0.006)
year fe yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
state fe yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
population weight yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R-squared within 0.809 0.821 0.812 0.814 0.843 0.846 0.838
R-squared overall 0.053 0.035 0.094 0.084 0.101 0.115 0.120
Observations 649 649 649 649 649 649 649
Years 2003-2015 2003-2015 2003-2015 2003-2015 2003-2015 2003-2015 2003-2015
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation robust standard errors in parenthesis clustered
at the state level. Control variables are log real mean income, log population and home-
ownership rate. House price index and income variables are deflated by CPI-UR-S series.
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TABLE 2.A.6. Income inequality and mortgage debt with alternative
measures of income inequality: the effect of the interest rate environment
Dependent variable: Real Mortgage Debt Balance per Capita (excluding
HELOC)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Gini -1.024∗∗
(0.460)
Gini x Real 10-year
rate
0.048
(0.236)
Relative mean devia-
tion
-2.673∗∗∗
(0.584)
Relative mean devia-
tion x Real 10-year
rate
-0.097
(0.145)
Atkinson index -2.999∗∗∗
(1.047)
Atkinson index x Real
10-year rate
0.065
(0.243)
Theil’s entropy index -0.562∗∗∗
(0.185)
Theil’s entropy index
x Real 10-year rate
0.010
(0.045)
Top 10% income share -0.023∗∗∗
(0.003)
Top 10% income share
x Real 10-year rate
0.001
(0.001)
Top 5% income share -0.010∗∗
(0.004)
Top 5% income share
x Real 10-year rate
0.002
(0.002)
Top 1% income share -0.028∗∗∗
(0.005)
Top 1% income share
x Real 10-year rate
-0.001
(0.001)
year fe yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
state fe yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
population weight yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R-squared within 0.809 0.822 0.812 0.814 0.844 0.758 0.839
R-squared overall 0.052 0.035 0.089 0.081 0.095 0.011 0.131
Observations 649 649 649 649 649 649 649
Years 2003-2015 2003-2015 2003-2015 2003-2015 2003-2015 2003-2015 2003-2015
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation robust standard errors in parenthesis clustered
at the state level. Control variables are log real mean income, log population and home-
ownership rate. House price index and income variables are deflated by CPI-UR-S series.
Real 10 year-rate is 10-year constant maturity treasury rate minus 10-year ahead inflation
forecasts from Survey of Professional Forecasters.
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Chapter 3
Global Banks and International
Transmission of Financial Shocks
This chapter analyses the role of global banks in international transmission of
shocks under financial sector heterogeneity across countries. In particular, (i)
bank capital requirements and (ii) firm borrowing constraints are different across
countries. I show that a financial shock might give rise to a global decline in real
output if the shock originates in the country with loose firm borrowing constraints.
Moreover, tight borrowing constraints and high bank capital requirements are
associated with limited economic contraction and fast recovery following a financial
shock, independent of its origin.
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3.1 Introduction
Recent financial crisis has shown how a shock undergone in developed
countries turned into a global slump and highlighted the importance of
the contraction in global banking activity. The decline in global lending
during the crisis was observed along two dimensions: the drying-up of
international interbank market and the decrease in intra-banking group
lending of the multinational banks. Although, the two sources are of
similar order of magnitude (Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012b)), during the
financial crisis intra-group positions did not fall as sharply as interbank
flows between unaffiliated parties (CGFS (2010)). Moreover, Cetorelli
and Goldberg (2012a) show that internal funding reallocation has been
a common characteristic of global banks’ conduct, observable in normal
times and not just in times of crisis.1 Thus a better understanding of the
underlying transmission channel is of great significance to design policies
to prevent such financial turmoils and minimize the costs in the event of a
crisis.
The Synchronized declines in global economic and banking activity
renewed attention to the role of financial markets for the international
transmission of shocks.2 Recent literature reaches a common conclu-
sion that introducing a financial sector into the benchmark international
business cycle model helps improve the model predictions regarding the
business cycle correlations across countries.3 Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2013)
and Kollmann et al. (2011) show that financial shocks to a global bank’s
assets forces the global bank to decrease lending globally. This gives rise
to a simultaneous decline in output across countries as entrepreneurs need
bank loans to finance expenses. On the other hand, both papers predict
a negative international spillover of a real shock similar to Backus et al.
(1992). Therefore, the degree of business cycle synchronization depends on
whether real or financial shocks dominate the economy.
The above mentioned studies assume that the countries that comprise
the world economy are symmetric not only in the technology but also in the
1CGFS (2010) also shows that multinational banks raise liquidity from various
jurisdictions and conduct liquidity management activating the internal markets to shift
liquidity to regions experiencing relative scarcity.
2See among many others Perri and Quadrini (2018), Mendoza and Quadrini (2010),
Dedola and Lombardo (2012) and Ueda (2012)
3Backus et al. (1992) show that following a productivity shock, the country experiences
an increase in marginal product of its inputs, receives capital from the rest of the economy
and thus GDP increases. However, the capital outflow from the nonaffected country
implies decline in economic activity and thus negative spillovers.
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degree of financial frictions. In this paper, I relax the second assumption
within the framework of a two-country international business cycle model
with a global bank and show that the asymmetry in the financial sector has
important implications for the dynamics of the global economic activity.4
Specifically, two types of asymmetries are considered: first, a global bank
faces different bank capital constraints across countries; and second, the
countries differ in the level of borrowing constraints faced by firms. A
global bank manages liquidity centrally and reallocates resources across its
offices in different countries and it is costly to deviate from the required
bank capital ratio in each location. Therefore, through managing the
liquidity in the central treasury and transferring funds from one office to
the other, it can minimize the total capital requirement cost. The rest of
the economy is rather standard. Each country is comprised of households
and entrepreneurs. Households provide labor to the domestic firm and
allocate resources to consumption and savings in terms of deposits with
the global bank. Entrepreneurs in both countries produce a homogeneous
good with the same technology using capital and labor and this good
can be traded freely. An entrepreneur accumulates capital and borrows
from the global bank to finance investment. However, only an exogenous
fraction of investment can be covered with bank loans. As I assume that
the countries are symmetric in the real side of the economy. Therefore, the
higher is the fraction of investment that can be financed with bank loans,
the higher is credit-to-GDP ratio.
In the benchmark calibration, I assume that one of the countries is
characterized by both higher bank capital requirement and lower firm
borrowing constraint compared to the other.5 I define this country as
the most developed-most regulated country.6 First, I show that a real
shock implies divergence in GDP dynamics across countries as is the
case under conventional international business cycle models (e.g. Backus
et al. (1992)). Following a negative productivity shock, GDP declines
4Mendoza and Quadrini (2010), Mendoza et al. (2009), Caballero et al. (2008), Aoki
et al. (2009) assume heterogeneous degree of domestic financial development across
countries. However, these models do not incorporate a global bank that can use internal
capital market as in this paper. Therefore, the implications of intra-banking group
positions cannot be analyzed within the framework of these papers.
5Kollmann et al. (2011) suggest that bank capital ratio is 7-8% for the US global banks,
where as same ratio is 4-5% for the European ones. Although, the aim of this paper is not
to focus on US-EU business cycle synchronization, I use this calibration as the benchmark.
6Note that this definition of financial development can equally be interpreted as
degree of exposure to the global bank lending or a country’s share in total bank assets.
Throughout the paper, I use these terms interchangeably. My definition of financial
development is similar to that of Aoki et al. (2009) that assumes heterogeneous collateral
constraints for firm borrowing across countries.
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as investment and consumption decrease in the country that is hit by
the shock. Lower investment implies lower demand for bank loans and
intra-banking group lending flows to the nonaffected country as it has
relatively higher productivity. Higher supply of loans available gives
rise to an increase in investment and GDP in the nonaffected country.
Although the countries differ in the domestic financial market structure,
a productivity shock in either country results in a similar international
transmission and GDP in each country responds in a symmetric way. Thus,
the first important finding of this paper is to show that for the international
transmission of a productivity shock, the source of the shock is immaterial.
This is not the case for the financial shocks, which is the second important
finding of this paper.
A financial shock results in a decline in GDP in both countries.
However, the severity of global downturn and the difference in the
GDP dynamics across countries depends on whether the financial crisis
started in the most developed-most regulated country or not. Since the
bank dividends from each country are perfect substitutes for the bank
shareholder, the source of the bank capital loss does not matter when
allocating the loans to each country but it affects the significance of the
contraction in financial intermediation. A financial shock that hits the
most developed-most regulated country gives rise to a more pronounced
global GDP decline compared to a similar shock in the least developed-
least regulated country. Since the most developed country comprises a
higher share of total bank assets compared to the other country, a default
shock in this country implies a significant bank capital loss and global
bank decreases total loans available to a larger extent than a default shock
in the least developed country would call for. Following a financial shock,
loans to least developed-least regulated country increase but loans to the
most developed-most regulated country decrease. Therefore, investment
increases in the least regulated-least developed country and decreases in
the other as the entrepreneurs in each country are constrained and need
bank loans to finance their investment. GDP recovers after a short period
of time in least developed-least regulated country; on the other hand,
GDP decline lasts for a longer time in the most developed-most regulated
country. Thus, the differences in the financial constraints across countries
gives rise to differences in the duration of a recession and have implications
for the business cycle synchronization.
To analyze the relevance of each financial constraint separately, I
calibrate the model so that countries so that they differ in one constraint at
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a time. First, I consider the case with equal regulation and different levels
of financial development. Following a default shock in either country, the
less developed a country is, the lower is the GDP decline and the shorter
the recession lasts compared to the other one. More developed country
undergoes a persistent GDP decline due to a decline in bank loans and
thus in investment. Moreover, the higher is the financial development in a
country, the higher is the global GDP decline following a financial shock in
that country. Second, I analyze the relevance of difference across countries
in banking regulation and thus the countries are assumed to be equal in
the level of financial development. Following a financial shock, the less
regulated a country is, the shorter the recession lasts and the economy
starts to expand after a short period of time. On the other hand, the
most regulated country experiences a persistent GDP fall, amount of which
is higher the higher is the constraint on bank capital. Finally, once the
countries are assumed to be symmetric in both banking regulation and
the level of financial development, it does not matter for the global GDP
dynamics which country is hit by the financial shock and GDP in each
country displays the same dynamics. This finding is consistent with those
of Kollmann et al. (2011) and Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2013). The contribution
of this paper is to show that once symmetric countries assumption is
relaxed, the global implications of financial shocks crucially depends on
the underlying financial conditions in the country from which the financial
turmoil originates.
Although the paper does not include a policy or welfare analysis, the
findings still have intuitive policy implications. First, prudential policy
of reducing the bank borrowing via increasing the borrowing margin can
lower the global cost of a financial crisis.7 A national financial policy of this
kind is beneficial for the other countries as well. Second, decreasing the
bank capital requirement as an ex-post policy intervention might mitigate
the costs of a financial crisis. In contrast to the prudential policy, lowering
the national bank capital requirement might imply negative international
repercussions. Therefore, international cooperation in both prudential and
ex-post financial policies might matter for global welfare.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 highlights
the differences in modeling assumptions of the current paper and the
related literature. Section 3 introduces the quantitative model. Section 4
7The borrowing margin can be increasing by applying a tax on borrowing or tightening
the borrowing constraint as suggested by Bianchi (2011).
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presents the impulse response analysis. Section 5 concludes and discusses
policy implications.
3.2 Related Literature
In this section I review the theoretical literature on international trans-
mission of shocks with two different types of financial intermediaries:
multinational intermediaries that operate locally in both countries and
international intermediaries that engage in cross-border lending and
borrowing.8
This paper is closest to the papers in the first line of literature, in
particular, to Kollmann et al. (2011) and Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2013). Both
papers model a global bank intermediating in two symmetric countries by
taking deposits and issuing loans. While Kollmann et al. (2011) assumes
perfect financial integration, Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2013) models the world
such that only an exogenous fraction of each economy has access to global
bank intermediation. Both papers find that following a financial shock,
the global bank decreases loans to both countries and financial integration
gives rise to higher business cycle synchronization. This paper shows that
this finding is a result of the assumption that the countries are symmetric.
To reach this conclusion I introduce two types of heterogeneities across
countries. First, I assume that the global bank is constrained with possibly
differing levels in both countries. This is because the subsidiaries of global
banks are separate legal entities and are subject to bank capital requirement
in the host country. Kollmann et al. (2011) assumes that the global bank
faces a single aggregate bank capital constraint although it operates in two
different countries.9 In this paper I show that different levels of bank capital
requirement has important implications for business cycle synchronization.
Second, in my model the firms face a borrowing constraint, i.e.
they can finance only a given fraction of their investment via bank
lending. Kollmann et al. (2011) focuses only on implications of financially
constrained lenders, thus this aspect is absent in their model. Kalemli-
Ozcan et al. (2013) assumes that the firms face a working capital constraint
8Although this paper is related to the international business cycles literature in the
broadest sense, to emphasize the contribution of this paper I focus on a narrower branch
of this literature in which financial intermediaries are at play. See also Buch et al. (2018) for
the results from internationally coordinated project by the International Banking Research
Network (IBRN) on the transmission of monetary policy through global banks across
countries.
9This type of modeling is consistent with a global bank structure with a branch instead
of a subsidiary.
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and have to borrow from a bank to pay the wages, which is uniform
across countries. I assume that the entrepreneurs in each country face
different levels of borrowing constraints and show that this heterogeneity
matters significantly for the transmission of financial shocks. Finally, in
this paper having a global bank does not necessarily mean perfect financial
integration unless the firms are unconstrained. That is, although a global
bank implies perfectly integrated capital markets, the degree of exposure to
the international financial market developments differ with the borrowing
constraint; higher borrowing constraint in a country implies lower share in
total banks assets and less dependence on or ability to access bank loans.
A failure in global banking activity is then of less cost for the country that
finances a relatively less share of investment via bank lending.
Finally, the assumptions of this paper has implications also for the
determination of optimal portfolio of the global bank balance sheet and
the rates of deposits and loans. In my model, the optimal portfolio
is endogenously determined and the global bank can charge different
loan and deposit rates across countries which is consistent with reality.
Kollmann et al. (2011) and Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2013) imposes that
global bank charges equal rates across countries, which results only as
a special case in this paper.10 While determining the optimal balance
sheet, Kollmann et al. (2011) assumes a deposit in the utility function,
which produces a deposit supply and avoids balance sheet indeterminacy.
Moreover, Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2013) assumes a given asset portfolio with
a given fraction of the risky asset, innovations to price of which is the
financial shock.
While the above studies employ a multinational bank set up, to
analyze the relevance of financial integration Ueda (2012) and Dedola
and Lombardo (2012) use models with financial intermediaries that are
located in one of the countries and engage in cross-border lending and
borrowing. Both papers employ credit contracts based on the financial
accelerator model by Bernanke et al. (1999) and assume that the financial
intermediaries are credit constrained as in this paper. Following a financial
shock, the net worth of the financial intermediary deteriorates and lending
to both countries’ entrepreneurs declines and thus GDP drops in both
countries. As is standard in the literature, these papers focus also on
symmetric countries in terms of financial frictions. An exception is
10Kollmann et al. (2011) model implies that effective loan rates, loan rate net of expected
default rate, to equal across countries. In this paper, the difference in loan rates depends
on the differences in deviations from bank capital requirement in each country.
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Mendoza and Quadrini (2010), which allow the countries to differ in
stages of financial development. Similar to this paper, the definition of
financial development is associated with the borrowing constraint for both
households and entrepreneurs. Another commonality with this paper is
that the bank in each country is subject to a capital requirement, however,
it is assumed to be uniform across countries. Mendoza and Quadrini (2010)
considers a financial shock only in the most developed country and show
that it gives rise to a decrease in bank lending in both countries. The
absence of internal capital markets of a global bank and different banking
regulations might be the source of the difference in predictions across
two models. As mentioned elsewhere intra-banking group flows that are
optimally set in this paper are important in size and understanding their
properties is crucial for the international transmission of shocks, which
is missing in the existing models with heterogeneous levels of financial
development across countries.
3.3 Model
In this section I develop a two-country model with a representative global
bank operating in both countries. In each country there is a representative
household and a representative firm. The representative bank collects
deposits from households and makes loans to entrepreneurs both in Home
and Foreign country. The entrepreneurs get a loan to finance a given
fraction of their investment. The countries differ in the level of financial
development, which is associated with the fraction of investment that can
be financed via bank borrowing. An identical final good is produced in
both countries using labor and capital. While the final good is traded freely
across countries, the inputs of production are not.
The representative global bank manages cash flows in the central
treasury and transfers liquidity between its offices in order to maximize
the shareholder’s utility, who consumes bank dividends. In doing so it
faces different capital requirement constraints across countries deviations
from which incurs costs. Thus, the global bank optimally sets the amount
of intra-banking group transfers and thus bank capital held in each country.
Difference across countries in financial constraints faced by firms and
global banks determine whether Home or Foreign office of a global bank
transfers liquidity to the other office.
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3.3.1 Households
In each country there is a continuum of identical infinitely lived households
whose preferences are given by:
max
Ct,Nt,Dt+1
∞
∑
t=0
βtU(Ct, Nt) (3.1)
Each period households decide on level of consumption, Ct, and savings in
the form of domestic bank deposits, Dt+1. They receive labor income wtNt,
where wt is the wage rate, and dividends pit from firms.11 The deposits
set in the previous period yield a gross rate of return Qt. Therefore the
household’s budget constraint is:
Ct + Dt+1 = wtNt + QtDt + pit (3.2)
Consumers’ problem is to choose consumption, labor, and bank deposits
to maximize life-time utility defined in Equation 3.1 subject to Equation
3.2 taking as given the deposit rates and wages. Substituting consumption
from the budget constraint gives the following first order conditions:
Uc(Ct, Nt)wt = −Ul(Ct, Nt) (3.3)
Uc(Ct, Nt) = βEt{Qt+1Uc(Ct+1, Nt+1)} (3.4)
where UC and Ul are marginal utility from consumption and disutility from
labor, respectively. Therefore at steady state Q is given by 1/β. As will be
shown in the following sections, the deposit rate will equal across countries
and implies perfect risk sharing.12
3.3.2 Firms
Firms in both countries use capital Kt and labor Nt to produce the
consumption good with a constant return to scale technology. They
accumulate capital, finance investment with loans from the bank and pay
back next period with gross loan rate of Rlt+1. This assumption relates the
real economy and the bank intermediation. I assume that a firm can finance
only a fraction θ of the investment via bank loans. A higher θ implies that
the firm faces a lower borrowing constraint or the global bank is more
willing to provide loans. Thus, it can also be interpreted as a measure for
the level of financial development.
11As in Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2013) I assume Home bias in equity holding.
12Log utility in both countries implies equal rate of increase in consumption.
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A firm sets labor demand Nt, loan demand Lt+1 and investment Xt
in order to maximize discounted dividend income. Since I assume that
the entrepreneurs are part of the household, the dividend income is
discounted by household marginal utility. Capital next period follows a
capital accumulation function where there are quadratic adjustment costs.
Therefore, the firms problem is given as
max
Nt,Lt+1,Xt,Kt+1
∞
∑
t=0
βUc(Ct, Nt)pit (3.5)
where
pit = AtF(Kt, Nt) + Lt+1 − wtNt − (Rt − ιt)Lt − Xt (3.6)
subject to
Lt+1 ≤ θXt (3.7)
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + Xt − φ2 Kt
(
Xt
Kt
− δ
)2
(3.8)
K0 (3.9)
where pit is the period t dividend of a firm which is given by the value
of production plus the current period loans from the bank, minus the wage
bill, interests payments on loans from the previous period and investment,
δ is the depreciation rate and φ is the magnitude of capital adjustment cost.
The payment for the previous period loans might exogenously get lower
than the loan rate charged by the bank, with a rate of ιt per loan borrowed.
One may interpret this as a partial default on loans.13
I assume that the firm borrowing constraint binds at all times Lt+1 =
θXt.14 Substituting this into the firms’ optimization problem above gives
13Kollmann et al. (2011) model loan default shock as a ratio to the loan rate (1− ιt)Rt.
14Both Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2013) and Kollmann et al. (2011) abstract from constraints
on the firm side and thus this kind of heterogeneity in a framework with a global bank is
not addressed in these papers.
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the following first order conditions:
Nt : AtFN(Kt, Nt)− wt = 0
(3.10)
Xt : −(1− θ)Uc(Ct, Nt)+
µt
(
1− φ
(
Xt
Kt
− δ
))
− βEt{(Rt+1 − ιt+1)Uc(Ct+1, Nt+1)θ}} = 0
(3.11)
Kt+1 : βµt+1
(
1− δ+ φEt
{
X2t+1
K2t+1
− δ2
})
−
µt + βEt{Uc(Ct+1, Nt+1)At+1Fk(Kt+1, Nt+1)} = 0
(3.12)
where µt is the Lagrange multiplier associate with the capital accumulation
rule 3.8 and Fi(., .) is the derivative of the production function with respect
to input i = Kt, Nt.
Since labor market is perfectly competitive, the workers are paid their
marginal product. Note that Equation (3.11) implies to a downward sloping
loan demand curve. that is, ceteris paribus, higher loan rate implies lower
investment and thus lower loan demand.
Finally, as is standard in the literature, I assume that the log productiv-
ity and the partial default follow AR(1) processes:
ln At = ρa ln At−1 + ea,t (3.13)
ιt = (1− ρι)ι+ ριιt−1 + eι,t (3.14)
where ι steady state level of partial default.
3.3.3 Global Banks
A representative global bank collects deposits from households and lend to
firms in both countries. Moreover, there are intra-banking groups transfers
such that both Foreign and Home office of a global bank might lend to the
office of its banking group in the other country. Table 3.1 displays the
balance sheet of a representative global bank. In period t, the Home office
of a global bank receives deposits Dt+1 from households and makes loans
Lt+1 to firms in Home country. Home office can also transfer funds Ht+1 to
and receive funds Ft+1 from the Foreign office of the banking group. Ψt+1
is then bank capital of a global bank in Home country.
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TABLE 3.1. Global Banks’ balance sheet in Home and Foreign country
Home Subsidiary
Assets Liabilities
Lt+1 Dt+1
Ht+1 Ft+1
Ψt+1
Foreign Subsidiary
Assets Liabilities
L∗t+1 D
∗
t+1
Ft+1 Ht+1
Ψ∗t+1
In this paper a global bank manages liquidity centrally and decides
on allocating bank capital across locations in order to maximize total
dividends from operating in both countries. By moving liquidity raised
in one country to the other, a global bank can also minimize the total cost
of intermediation, which can result from different bank capital regulations
in each country.15
Bank capital of each office should be more than a given fraction of
the loans issued to firms by the bank office: γ(Lt+1 + Ht+1) ≤ Ψt+1 and
γ∗(Lt+1 + Ft+1) ≤ Ψ∗t+1. One may interpret this as a legal requirement
or as an exogenous targeted leverage which might be a result of market
pressures in each location.16 Organizational structure that is in line with
the legal requirement explanation is Foreign office being a subsidiary, which
is subject to the capital requirement regulations in the Foreign country;
instead of a branch, which is subject to the requirements in the Home
country.17
Similar to Gerali et al. (2010), I assume the bank faces a quadratic cost
if it deviates from the targeted capital ratio in each country. Therefore, it
is costly to hold both excess and an insufficient amount of bank capital.
Excess bank capital in Home bank office is then given as:
Ωt = Ψt+1 − γ(Lt+1 + Ht+1) = (1− γ)(Lt+1 + Ht+1)− Ft+1 − Dt+1 (3.15)
15CGFS (2010) reviews the funding patterns of globally active banks and one reason for
the centralization of liquidity management is to minimize the total cost of intermediation
as the banking group.
16Kiyotaki and Moore (2005) assume that the banker can abscond a fraction γ of
the bank’s assets without a cost. Incentive compatibility then implies that the bank
capital(equity) cannot fall below the assets with which the banker can walk away with:
Ψt+1 ≥ γLt+1. This type of modeling is an example for market pressures approach to
have required level of capital, which ensures that the bank shareholders act in the interest
of the depositors.
17Following the financial crisis, one can argue that the difference between a branch and
subsidiary mode of representation in a host country has declined. This is because global
banks that have high foreign representation in a host country, i.e. global systemically
important banks, are also subject to additional capital buffers even if they have only
branches in a host economy.
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For the Foreign office excess bank capital is18 :
Ω∗t = Ψ∗t+1 − γ∗(L∗t+1 + Ft+1) = (1− γ∗)(L∗t+1 + Ft+1)− Ht+1 − D∗t+1
(3.16)
Note that, if a bank falls short of the bank capital requirement, then,
excess bank capital is a negative amount and banks bear a cost. This can
be interpreted as a portfolio adjustment cost for the bank. The idea is
that when the bank has less than required level of capital, equivalently
more leveraged than the target, it will have to tap interbank market or to
find out creative ways of finance which will be costly. A quadratic cost
function implies that it is also costly to hold excess capital, although it
doesn’t violate the legal capital requirement. One can argue that holding
excess capital is foregone dividends for a global bank’s shareholders and
thus deviations from a target bank capital ratio is also costly.
A representative global bank maximizes the shareholder’s utility de-
rived from consuming total banking group dividends, where bank divi-
dends raised in Home and Foreign offices are perfect substitutes
max
∞
∑
t=0
βbU(Bt) =
∞
∑
t=0
βb
B1−σ
b
t
1− σb (3.17)
where Bt is the total dividends from operating in Home and Foreign
countries, σb is the risk aversion parameter. The dividends earned from
intermediation in each country are defined as:
Bt = qt + q∗t (3.18)
qt = Dt+1− Lt+1− (Ht+1 + Ft+1) + (Rt− ιt)Lt− R ft (Ft−Ht)−QtDt−
ξ
2
Ω2t
(3.19)
q∗t = D∗t+1− L∗t+1+(Ht+1+ Ft+1)+ (R∗t − ι∗t )L∗t −Q∗t D∗t +R ft (Ft−Ht)−
ξ
2
Ω∗2t
(3.20)
where qt and q∗t are dividends from the Home and the Foreign office,
respectively. Again, Rt is the loan rate and Qt is the deposit rate in Home
country. Different than Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2013) and Kollmann et al.
(2011), I allow the loan rate R∗t and deposit rate Q∗t to differ from those in
Home country. I assume that banks face a partial default risk or credit loss
risk ιt (ι∗t ) per unit of loan issued in Home (Foreign ) country, which is non
18Note that excess capital Ωt can also be written as excess inverse leverage Ω˜t =
Kbt+1
Nt+1
−
1
γ as in Gerali et al. (2010) , thus Ω˜t =
Ωt
Lt+1
.
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zero at steady state.19 Note that since the income flow is managed centrally,
deposit payments and interest earned on deposits from interoffice lending
cancel out. This is consistent with the centralized business model.
The problem implies the following first order conditions:
Lt+1 : U′(Bt)(1+ ξ(1− γ)Ωt) = βbEt{(Rt+1 − ιt+1)U′(Bt+1)} (3.21)
L∗t+1 : U
′(Bt)(1+ ξ(1− γ∗)Ω∗t ) = βbEt{(R∗t+1 − ι∗t+1)U′(Bt+1)} (3.22)
Dt+1 : U′(Bt)(1+ ξΩt) = βbQt+1EtU′(Bt+1) (3.23)
D∗t+1 : U
′(Bt)(1+ ξΩ∗t ) = βbQ∗t+1EtU
′(Bt+1) (3.24)
Ft+1 : ξΩt = ξ(1− γ∗)Ω∗t − λ∗t (3.25)
Ht+1 : ξ(1− γ)Ωt = ξΩ∗t + λt (3.26)
CQ : Ht+1λt = 0 (3.27)
CQ : Ft+1λ∗t = 0 (3.28)
Increasing loans to Home, Lt+1, implies lower dividends and higher
excess capital at time t, but results in higher expected interest earnings
at period t + 1. Therefore, Equation (3.21) shows that optimal amount of
Lt+1 equalizes marginal cost to marginal benefit of increasing Lt+1 at time
t. Moreover, it gives the upward sloping loan supply in Home: everything
else constant, higher loan rate implies higher excess capital and thus higher
loans. Similarly, higher deposits from Home, Dt+1, increases dividends at
time t and lowers the excess capital and thus the cost related to it, however,
implies higher interest payment at period t+ 1 as shown in Equation (3.23).
Equation (3.26) shows that setting the intra-group transfers is an intra
temporal choice and optimal Ht+1 is such that the cost of increasing excess
regulative capital in Home country office is equal to benefit from decreasing
the same cost in the Foreign office, through increasing excess bank capital
in Home and decreasing it in the Foreign country. Equation (3.25) states the
same for deposits of Foreign office in Home one. Constraint qualification
conditions ensure that both Ht+1 and Ft+1 are non-negative. As it will be
shown in the next section, in equilibrium, only one of the bank offices lend
to the other one.
19Introducing steady state partial default is in the same fashion as introducing an
intermediation cost. This is a standard assumption in the literature when the banks
operate under perfect competition, see for example Kollmann et al. (2011) and Kalemli-
Ozcan et al. (2013), which ensures that at steady state the loan spread is positive.
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In this paper, the bank portfolio of loans, intra-group lending and
deposits in each country are endogenously determined in equilibrium.20
That is, bank capital requirement and the borrowing constraint on the
entrepreneur side across countries give rise to a unique bank balance
sheet.21
3.3.4 Equilibrium
The equilibrium is a collection of prices {Qt, Q∗t , Rt, R∗t , wt, w∗t } and quan-
tities {Ct, C∗t , Dt, D∗t , Kt, K∗t , Nt, N∗t , Lt+1, L∗t+1, qt, q∗t , Xt, X∗t } and exogenous
processes {At, A∗t ,ιt, ι∗t } such that both goods and financial intermediation
markets clear.
Market clearing for the final good requires:
Ct +C∗t +Xt +X∗t + Bt = AtF(kt, Nt) + A∗t F(k∗t , l∗t )−
ψ
2
Ω2t −
ψ∗
2
Ω∗2t (3.29)
Similar to Kollmann et al. (2011) I assume that excess capital costs are
in units of consumption goods of the country of the bank office. Then, I
define Home GDP, Yt, as final good production net of inputs used by the
bank to pay the excess capital cost:
Yt = AtF(Kt, Nt)− ψ2Ω
2
t (3.30)
Therefore, total world output is sum of household consumption,
investment and bank dividends in both countries:
Ct + C∗t + Xt + X∗t + Bt = Yt +Y∗t
Financial intermediation market equilibrium requires that the global
bank’s balance sheet is balanced.22
Lt+1 + L∗t+1 = Dt+1 + D
∗
t+1 +Ψt+1 +Ψ
∗
t+1 (3.31)
20Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2013) assumes a given portfolio of assets for the global bank.
In particular, the a given fraction of total assets of the global bank are loans issued to the
entrepreneurs and the remaining fraction is invested in a risky asset.
21To solve for the bank balance sheet, i.e. portfolio of loans and deposits, Kollmann et
al. (2011) impose that interest rates on loans net of default are equal across countries and
assume a deposit in the utility function. In this paper, equal loan rate arises in equilibrium
only under homogeneous capital requirement across countries.
22Note that intra-banking group transfers, i.e. deposits in Foreign office deposited by
Home office, or vice versa, appears on both sides of the consolidated balance sheet and
cancel out.
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Finally, loan demand equals loan supply in both countries.
Lt+1 = θXt (3.32)
L∗t+1 = θ
∗X∗t (3.33)
Then I define current account as Home GDP net of consumption, investment
and half of the total bank dividends:23
CAt = Yt − Ct − Xt − 0.5Bt (3.34)
3.3.5 Calibration
I derive a numerical solution using standard linearization techniques and
functional form assumptions. The elasticity of final good output with
respect to capital is set at α = 0.33. One period corresponds to one quarter.
Accordingly, I set the depreciation rate of physical capital at δ = 0.025, as
commonly done in quarterly macro models. Following Kalemli-Ozcan et
al. (2013) I set capital adjustment cost at φ = 0.43. The households are
assumed to have log utility, σ = 1 and the bank shareholder is risk neutral,
σb = 0.01. I assume β = β∗ = 0.99 and the bank shareholder is more
patient than households, β∗ = 0.999.
I assume that the firms can finance only 20% of their investment by bank
loans in the Home country, θ = 0.2, on the other hand, Foreign entrepreneurs
are unconstrained, θ∗ = 1. This implies that the assets held in the Home
country comprise a smaller fraction of all assets of the global bank. I also
consider the case where both countries are characterized by unconstrained
firms and thus have equal weight in the asset portfolio of the global bank
as is the case in both Kollmann et al. (2011) and Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2013).
Required bank capital ratio in Home country is set at γ = 0.04 and in
Foreign country is taken as γ∗ = 0.08. Empirically, the capital ratios of
the major EA banks (i.e., ratios of bank equity to total (non risk-weighted)
assets) have typically ranged 3 to 5% in the period 1995 to 2010, while the
capital ratios of US commercial banks have generally been in the range 7
to 8% (Kollmann et al. (2011)). I use this findings as the benchmark case
and then I also consider the case where both countries have equal capital
requirement ratios.
23As in Kollmann et al. (2011) I assume that half of the total bank dividends are spent
in each country. Therefore, total consumption in Home country is the sum of household
consumption and half of the total bank dividends. Assigning unequal weights for the
dividend share does not change the cyclical dynamics of the current account.
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In this paper, I allow bank capital to be held either more or less than
the regulated level at the steady state, which is determined by optimality
conditions of global banks’ shareholder’s utility maximization. Calibrating
the magnitude of cost of excess capital ξ = ξ∗ = 0.45 gives Ω = Ω∗ =
0.022.24 This implies that at steady state bank capital-to-loan ratio is 0.39
in Home and 0.15 in Foreign country, both of which are higher than the
regulated level of 0.04 and 0.08, respectively in Home and Foreign country.
Under this calibration, Home office of the global bank lends to the Foreign
office. Thus the country with higher financial development receives savings
from the less developed country as is the case in Mendoza et al. (2009) and
Mendoza and Quadrini (2010). Then intra group lending H, Home loans
and Foreign loans comprises 17%, 14% and 69% of the total assets of the
global bank, respectively.
At steady state the bank capital ratio is 16%, or equivalently, leverage
of the consolidated bank balance sheet is 6.25.25 Parameter assumptions
imply steady state loan rates of R = 8.11% and R∗ = 7.94% and deposit
rate of Q = 4% per annum.26 I assume that only 1% of the loans are
defaulted at the steady state in both countries, that is, ι = ι∗ = 0.01.27
I calibrate the parameters of the exogenous shock processes similar to
Kollmann et al. (2011) The persistence and the variance of the productivity
is calibrated uniformly across countries, i.e. ρa = ρ∗a = 0.95 and σa = σa∗ =
0.0053. As far as the financial shocks are concerned, I assume that loan
default shocks follow AR(1) processes with persistence ρι = ρ∗ι = 0.8.28
Finally, the standard deviation of each financial shock is 0.0001.
24Different calibrations of the excess capital cost changes only the steady state bank
portfolio but doesn’t affect the dynamics of the model.
25Bank capital ratio=
Ψt+1+Ψ∗t+1
Lt+1+L∗t+1+Ht+1
. Imposing no excess capital implies very high levels
of steady state leverage, which is 20 in Kollmann et al. (2011).
26Keeping everything else constant, decreasing the capital requirement in Home
country, γ = 0.03, implies a higher intra-banking group lending, 16.7% of total assets
and higher loan rate in Home country, R = 8.16% per annum.
27This number is interpreted as an intermediation cost rather than default and
calibrated as 4% in Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2013) to get reasonable loan spread, in this paper
higher intermediation cost, i.e. 4%, would imply around 20% loan rate.
28The financial shocks are calibrated this way for standard business cycle movements.
However, in the impulse response analysis part I will present the results for unexpected
one-time increase in default shocks as in Kollmann et al. (2011) to analyze the implications
of sudden drop in bank’s revenues due to unusual defaults as the case in 2007-2009
financial crisis.
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FIGURE 3.1. Intra-banking group lending under different calibrations of
borrowing and bank capital constraints in Home country
0
0.01
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0.04
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0.06
0.07
0.08
Level of intra-banking group lending for different values of Home bank capital regulation,
γ, and Home borrowing constraint, θ, when the corresponding parameters are taken as the
benchmark case for the Foreign , i.e. θ∗ = 1 and γ∗ = 0.08.
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3.3.6 Determinants of intra-banking group lending at steady
state
Figure 3.1 displays the steady state level of intra-banking group lending for
different calibrations of Home capital regulation, γ, and Home borrowing
constraint, θ, when corresponding parameters are kept as the benchmark
case for Foreign country, i.e. θ∗ = 1 and γ∗ = 0.08.
For a given level of capital regulation, intra-banking group lending
H decreases as the borrowing constraint is relaxed, i.e. θ increases, in
Home country. This implies that as for a representative global bank,
lending to Home firms increase, intra-banking group lending from Home
to Foreign declines to satisfy local demand for loans. Inter office deposits
increase only slightly with capital regulation for a given level of borrowing
constraint. For some parameter calibrations at steady state the Foreign office
deposits in the Home office instead.29
3.4 Impulse Response Analysis
In this section I present responses of macroeconomics variables in both
countries to real and financial shocks. The main results of this analysis
is that as far as productivity shocks are concerned, heterogeneity in the
firm borrowing constraint and bank capital requirements across countries
does not interact with the transmission into real outcomes. That is, an
own negative productivity shock gives rise to an equal decline in GDP in
each country although one is characterized by a financial market with both
higher borrowing constraints and bank capital requirement than the other.
A corollary of this result is that a real shock in one country spills over to
the other one symmetrically whether the shock country comprises a high
share of bank assets or not. On the other hand, the country that a financial
shock originates from affects the degree of global GDP decline. Moreover,
the recovery from a global downturn is heterogeneous across countries. I
first discuss a real shock and then a financial shock in both countries.
3.4.1 Impulse responses to productivity shocks
Figure 3.1 displays the responses to a 1% negative shock productivity in
Home country. All variables are expressed as percentage deviation from
29Deposits of Home office at the Foreign office, H, constitute 2% of total banks assets,
and deposits of Foreign office at the Home office, F, constitute 1% of total banks assets for
bank capital requirements of 20% and 0% respectively, when θ = θ∗ = 1 and γ∗ = 0.08.
137
steady state, except for the interest rates and spreads, which are deviations
in percentage points. Current accounts are in levels.
Following a negative productivity shock to Home productivity, GDP,
consumption and investment decreases in Home country. Lower produc-
tivity implies lower demand for loans and lowers the loan rate charged
to Home entrepreneurs. This gives rise to an increase in intra-banking
group transfer from Home office in Foreign country. Therefore, supply of
loans available to the Foreign entrepreneurs increases and thus lowers the
loan rate also in Foreign country. Higher loans result in higher investment
and higher GDP in the Foreign country although consumption decreases.
Spillover of Home productivity shock to the Foreign real activity is rather
limited initially. The increase in Foreign GDP is 0.02% in the first period but
investment increases significantly, which strengthens the spillover effect
and increases Foreign GDP over time.
Bank optimality conditions imply that excess bank capital and deposit
rate changes need to be symmetric across countries30, deposit demand in
both countries adjust. Since a rise in interbank lending increases excess
bank capital in Home country and decreases that in Foreign country, deposit
demand increases in the former and decreases in the latter. In effect excess
bank capital declines in both locations and deposit rates also decline,
however, loan spreads increase. Therefore, the model implies a negative
correlation between loan spreads and total bank capital; and also gives rise
to a counter cyclical current account consistent with data.
Allowing the bank to charge different interest rates and the assumption
that the loans are used to finance a given fraction of investment allows in-
vestment to respond significantly to productivity shocks in both countries.
Thus the spillover effect is stronger in this paper compared to Kollmann
et al. (2011) which abstracts from borrowing constraints on firms. This
is consistent with the findings of Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2013) that higher
financial integration implies less output comovement across countries by
moving resources from the country hit by a negative productivity shock.
Figure 3.2 displays the responses to a 1% negative shock to Foreign
productivity. The responses are similar to the ones with a Home pro-
ductivity shock. The intra-group lending decreases as Home is relatively
more productive and loan demand is higher there. The only difference in
responses to the productivity shocks is that of the loan spread. Following
a Home productivity shock deposit rate increases, on the other hand, it
30Note that this is equivalent to having the same deposit rates across countries as steady
state level is also the same.
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FIGURE 3.1. Impulse responses to a negative Home productivity shock
Responses to 1% negative shock to Home productivity. Interest rates, ratios and spreads
are expresses in percentage points, other variables are in percentage deviations from
steady state. Current accounts are in levels.
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decreases following a Foreign productivity decline. However, the model
implies a negative correlation between bank capital ratio and loan spreads
as is the case with Home productivity shock.
As far as productivity shocks are concerned, the magnitude of the re-
sponses of variables don’t change with the country that faces a productivity
decline. That is, responses of Home country quantities in Figure 3.2 are the
same as those of Foreign country quantities in Figure 3.1. This is not the
case for financial shocks as I show in the next section.
3.4.2 Impulse responses to financial shocks
In this section I consider a temporary shock to partial loan default. The
shock calibrated here is that ι and ι∗ increase to 0.05 at the period of
the shock and returns to its steady state value of 0.01 the next period.31
Kollmann et al. (2011) calibrates this shock so that credit loss is 5% of steady
state world GDP, in order to capture exceptional events of 2007-2009 which
roughly corresponds to the credit losses originating in the US during that
period. Note that in the benchmark calibration of my paper, Home loans
constitute only 14% of loans issued by the global bank at steady state. Thus
the financial shock approximates to a credit loss of 1% of steady state Home
GDP and 5% of steady state Foreign GDP. Therefore, here I consider a more
conservative financial turmoil compared to Kollmann et al. (2011).
Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4 display responses to a one-time 1 percentage
point unexpected increase in partial loan default in Home country and
Foreign, respectively. Variables are expressed as percentage deviation from
steady state, interest rates, ratios and spreads are in percentage points.
Current accounts are in levels. An increase in loan default implies lower
bank dividend income due to lower return on loans in period of the shock.
Two main findings arise from the impulse responses to loan default
shocks. First, tightly linked to the assumptions regarding the degree of
heterogeneity in firm borrowing constraints across countries. Foreign loans
of a global bank is 5 times more than that of Home. Therefore, symmetric
shock implies a larger dividend income shock for a global bank shareholder
and thus responses in Figure 3.4 are roughly 5 times more than that of
Figure 3.3. The decrease in bank capital ratio is higher compared to the
case in Figure 3.4 as Foreign loans constitute a higher share of total bank
assets. Thus bank capital loss and total loan supply decrease are more
pronounced in this case, which translates into a deeper global recession.
31Thus responses to loan default shock are calibrated with ρι = ρι∗ = 0.
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FIGURE 3.2. Impulse responses to a negative Foreign productivity shock
Responses to 1% negative shock to Foreign productivity. Interest rates, ratios and spreads
are expresses in percentage points, other variables are in percentage deviations from
steady state. Current accounts are in levels.
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Second main finding is that following a partial default shock in either
Home or Foreign country, Figures 3.3 and 3.4 display that GDP declines
in both countries. However, the decline in GDP lasts only six quarters in
Home country and then Home economy starts to expand. This is because
dividends from each office are perfect substitutes for a global bank and
a loss resulting from one office affects the bank’s lending in both. As it
is costly to deviate from the required capital in both countries, a global
bank lowers the total supply of loans but the decomposition matters for
the transmission dynamics. In particular, Home loans increase but Foreign
loans decreases although even when default originates from Home country.
Intra-banking group transfers also decline. Since loans increase, investment
also increases and results in current account deficit in Home. As the increase
in investment slows down, current account improves and Home GDP goes
back to its steady state level in six periods and then begins to improve.
Asymmetric dynamics of GDP across countries results from that of
the investment. Foreign loans decrease and thus investment decreases,
which makes the GDP decline deeper in Foreign country. As Foreign loans
constitute 69% of the total assets of the global bank and they decrease more
than the increase in Home loans, the bank capital ratio declines following a
default shock in Home country.
Figure 3.4 displays responses to the default shock in Foreign country.
Responses of all macroeconomic variables are qualitatively same as the case
where the default shock hits the Home office, except for intra-group lending
and thus the current account. This is because, following a default shock in
Foreign country, deposits increase and thus demand for intra-group lending
decreases. Current account improves in Foreign as both investment and
consumption decrease.
These findings contrast with those of Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2013) and
Kollmann et al. (2011), where GDP contraction lasts equally long periods
of time. Therefore, a financial shock does not result in a decline in the
economic activity globally once the homogeneity assumption is relaxed. I
address the implications of the two types of heterogeneity for GDP and
bank loan portfolio dynamics separately in the next section.
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FIGURE 3.3. Impulse responses to a Home loan default shock
Responses to one-period increase in partial loan default in Home country, ιt, from 1% to
5%. Interest rates, ratios and spreads are expresses in percentage points, other variables
are in percentage deviations from steady state. Current accounts are in levels.
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FIGURE 3.4. Impulse responses to a Foreign loan default shock
Responses to one-period increase in partial loan default in Foreign country, ι∗t , from 1% to
5%. Interest rates, ratios and spreads are expresses in percentage points, other variables
are in percentage deviations from steady state. Current accounts are in levels.
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3.5 Implications of one type of financial hetero-
geneity at a time
Figures 3.5 to 3.8 demonstrate the responses to financial shocks when
the countries are homogeneous either in bank capital regulation or in the
borrowing constraint, respectively. In all figures the solid line corresponds
to the case with homogeneous countries: no borrowing constraint on the
firm side, θ = 1, and 8% bank capital requirement.
Figure 3.5 and 3.6 display the case when both countries have equal bank
capital regulation and Home firms face a binding borrowing constraint with
different levels of tightness and Foreign firms are unconstrained. When the
countries are symmetric as in Kollmann et al. (2011) and Kalemli-Ozcan
et al. (2013), GDP decline lasts equally long periods in both countries
following a financial shock in each country. Similarly, loans and loan
spreads decrease by the same amount across countries independent of the
origin of the shock. However, the dynamic responses change with the
source of the financial shock once the countries differ in the borrowing
constraint. Declining θ means Home can finance a declining fraction of
their investments via bank lending which is equivalent to having a smaller
share in total assets of the bank. If the global bank is hit with the financial
shock in Home, the effect of it in GDP of both countries gets smaller with θ,
or equivalently the size of steady state Home loans. Still due to differences
in bank lending across countries, Home GDP recovers but Foreign GDP fails
to do so. However, if the global bank faces a loan default shock at Foreign,
which constitutes a larger share of total assets of the bank, Home faces a
small period of contraction as in the benchmark case and Foreign goes to
through a deeper recession as loans to Foreign and thus Foreign investment
decrease significantly. Increase in Home loans translates into an increase in
GDP after a short period of time.
Figures 3.7 and 3.8 show impulse responses to financial shocks when
both countries are financially unconstrained. Therefore, at steady state
each country comprises 50% of the total assets of the global bank and there
are no intra-group transfers. When countries are symmetric, following
financial shocks the dynamics of GDP and financial variables are the same
independent of the country that is hit by the shock. The origin of the shock
does not matter even if the countries have different regulation policies.
That is, once they are equal in loan size, the transmission of the shock
across countries is symmetric but the dynamics vary with the degree of
heterogeneity in regulation. Figures 3.7 and 3.8 both show that following a
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financial shock, GDP declines in both countries initially but Foreign recovers
faster as Home office faces higher capital regulation. This is because the
global bank provides more loans to Foreign and less to Home as it is less
costly to hold excess capital in less regulated country.
Figures 3.5 to 3.8 imply that the country that comprises a higher share of
the total assets of the global bank suffers more from financial shock, even if
it does not originate from defaulting domestic entrepreneurs. Higher bank
capital regulation depresses bank loans further and deepens the effects
of the financial shocks. Once the assumption of symmetric countries
is relaxed, the transmission of financial shocks significantly differ across
countries.
3.6 Conclusions
The 2008-2009 financial crisis is characterized by synchronized drops in
economic and banking activity across countries. However, the recovery
from this episode was heterogeneous, in particular across developed
and developing countries. This highlighted the importance of a better
understanding of how global banks transmit a financial shock originating
in one country to the others. This question is addressed in the literature
by assuming that the countries that comprise the world economy are
symmetric in both the real and the financial side of the economy. In this
chapter, I relax the latter assumption by allowing for different levels of
financial development, which is measured as high share of bank finance
in investment, and bank capital requirements across countries. Although
this type of asymmetry across countries is overlooked in the literature, I
show that it has important global implications. Specifically, a financial
shock in the country with a higher level of financial development gives rise
to a deeper global GDP drop than a similar shock in the less financially
developed country. Moreover, although GDP declines simultaneously in
both countries in a financial turmoil, the recession lasts shorter in the
country with lower financial development and bank capital requirement
compared to the other country. Finally, perhaps not surprisingly, the
transmission of a real shock is symmetric across countries independent
of whether the source of the productivity shock is the most developed
economy or not. The modeling framework lends itself to several extensions.
A natural extension would involve incorporating differences in the
real sector across countries, i.e. economic size, technological or factor
endowment differences. This would provide a further step towards
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bringing the model closer to the real world. Then, interactions between
both types of asymmetries might affect the global implications not only
of the financial shocks but also of the real ones. This would allow us to
analyze the potential differences in global implications of financial crises
in the developed and the developing countries, the latter can be thought
of less financially developed and of a smaller economic size compared to a
developed country.
The model developed here implies that discouraging borrowing from
the global bank gives rise to a lower GDP decline following a financial
shock. Therefore, lowering the credit-to-GDP ratio arises as a prudential
policy prescription. One way to implement this policy is tightening the
borrowing margin as suggested by Bianchi (2011). Moreover, the model
implies that the country with lower bank capital requirement faces a
shorter period of recession. Thus, lowering the bank capital requirement
in response to a financial shock might help mitigate the contractionary
effects of a financial crisis ex-post. These sovereign policy actions are
beneficial for the country that exercises them. However, the international
implications of the proposed policies also matter. Although, a prudential
policy implies lower GDP decline in both countries, lowering the bank
capital requirement might come at the cost of deepening the crisis in
the other country. This implies that uncoordinated policies regarding
global bank regulation might imply a global welfare cost and can be
interpreted as a need for a supranational authority that takes into account
the international spillovers. A different financial policy design could be
a mix of both measures proposed as suggested by Jeanne and Korinek
(2013). As they target different financial constraints a mix of the two
might be optimal both at the national and the international level. Thus,
a further interesting extension would involve introducing financial policy
responding to financial and macroeconomic conjecture and a rigorous
analysis of welfare implications of different policies.
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FIGURE 3.5. Selected impulse responses to a Home financial shock under
symmetric bank capital requirement across countries
Selected impulse responses to one-period increase in partial Home loan default, ιt
from 1% to 5%. γ = γ∗ = 0.08 and θ∗ = 1, solid line: θ = 1, dashed line: θ = 0.6,
dash-dotted line: θ = 0.2
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FIGURE 3.6. Selected impulse responses to a Foreign financial shock under
symmetric bank capital requirement across countries
Selected impulse responses to one-period increase in partial Home loan default, ι∗t
from 1% to 5%. γ = γ∗ = 0.08 and θ∗ = 1, solid line: θ = 1, dashed line: θ = 0.6,
dash-dotted line: θ = 0.2
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FIGURE 3.7. Selected impulse responses to Home financial shock under
symmetric borrowing constraint across countries
Responses to one-period increase in partial loan default, ιt from 1% to 5%. θ =
θ∗ = 1 and γ∗ = 0.08, solid line: γ = 0.08, dashed line: γ = 0.12, dash-dotted line:
γ = 0.16.
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FIGURE 3.8. Selected impulse responses to a Foreign financial shock under
symmetric borrowing constraint across countries
Responses to one-period increase in partial loan default, ι∗t from 1% to 5%. θ =
θ∗ = 1 and γ∗ = 0.08, solid line: γ = 0.08, dashed line: γ = 0.12, dash-dotted line:
γ = 0.16.
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